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Abstract

To achieve true sustainability, planners must balance the interests of environmental
protection, economic development, and social equity. In a critically changing, complex
ecosystem such as Louisiana’s coast, challenges to achieve the perfect equilibrium are further
compounded. Following the logic of emerging adaptive co-management literature, the planning
framework for Louisiana’s Coastal Master Plan could be transformed into a more collaborative,
democratic process. Adaptive co-management is a regime which provides power to local
citizens, often in possession of invaluable traditional ecological knowledge. In general, it
focuses on constant learning and collaboration. Through power-sharing and participatory action,
we embrace science, but step back from technocracy. We utilize local knowledge, and combine
it with expertise.

Environmental Planning, Louisiana’s Comprehensive Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast,
Adaptive Co-Management, Coastal Management, Plan Evaluation, Sustainability, Citizen
Participation
vii

Chapter I

Introduction
The Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA) released the draft of
Louisiana’s 2012 Coastal Master Plan on January 12, 2012, citing a land loss crisis requiring
swift action. Whether or not the 2012 Coastal Master Plan achieved the maximum land building
capacity is a matter of speculation. Nonetheless, the goal of any plan responsibly touting
sustainability is to equally balance consideration for economic development, environmental
protection, and social equity.
Louisiana’s 2012 Coastal Master Plan utilized technical models self-proclaimed to be the
most advanced science and technology available for coastal land building purposes. I will argue
that this method is not sustainable, however, because the plan relied more heavily on economic
and environmental considerations than social ones. A number of local citizens, plagued with
frustration, feel that the participatory process aligned with the drafting of Louisiana’s 2012
Coastal Master Plan amounted to little more than a form of tokenism, leaving the fate of their
region in jeopardy. More specifically, participation within public hearings was a form of
consultation, where officials received public input, but are in no way required to use input
received.
In response to public criticism, this thesis will focus on an alternative form of natural
resource management—adaptive co-management—which is successfully embraced in various
regions of Europe and Canada. The hypothesis of this thesis, therefore, is that adaptive co-

1

management would constitute a more effective, sustainable, and democratic form of governance
for the management of social-ecological systems in coastal Louisiana.
Purpose of the Study
The intent of this thesis is to bring attention coastal restoration planning in Louisiana, and
progressive ways to improve Louisiana’s Comprehensive Coastal Master Plan for a Sustainable
Coast from an angle of social equity. A more general purpose is to provide a prelude for further,
comprehensive study on the potential for adaptive co-management in coastal regions of the U.S.
Throughout the study, the analysis will consider three main research questions: (1) How does
adaptive co-management function as a framework for natural resources planning and
management? (2) What are the strengths and weaknesses of Louisiana’s 2012 Coastal Master
Plan and its policy framework? (3) How could adaptive co-management reform Louisiana’s
Coastal Planning process?
Chapter II describes the exploratory research methodology utilized for this study and the
logic linking the data to the initial research questions. It addresses the challenges of sampling
and validity, and describes the plan’s method of evaluation. Chapter III offers a background to
Louisiana’s coastal crisis and the roles of the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and
Restoration Act (CWPPRA) and the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA) to set
up a comparative basis between current and potential governance frameworks. This chapter will
segue from current affairs to hypothetical paradigms in the next chapter. A literature review
exploring an alternative approach known as adaptive co-management will be introduced Chapter
IV. Chapter V offers an integrated plan evaluation, while Chapter VI assesses the plan for
sustainability and public participation. Finally in Chapter VII, a set of recommendations for an
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alternative adaptive co-management framework, discussion, and a conclusion will close the
exploratory study.

3

Chapter II

The Methodology
In response to Louisiana’s coastal crisis, the State faces an imperative to reverse the
continuing trends of land loss and inundation. The State agency, CPRA, compiled a Coastal
Master Plan in 2012 to address these challenges and prepare for the future. Over the next 50
years, the plan estimated a potential loss of 1,750 square miles of land if nothing is done. This is
in addition to the 1,880 square miles of land loss experienced in the previous 80 years (CPRA
2012a:18). CPRA claimed that the plan demonstrated the “best use of dollars based on what we
know today” (28). The Coastal Master Plan, however, is not and does not claim to be infallible.
In fact, constructive criticism, for the sake of improvement, will illustrate a high level of
remaining social risk and uncertainty despite the best ecological modeling software available.
To understand the methodology, it must first be clarified that the topic is qualitative and
exploratory in nature and depends upon the development of theory. The results of the 2012
Coastal Master Plan are yet to be seen, but the efficacy of the plan can be explored through the
utilization of established planning theory. A background in Chapter III introduces the value of
Coastal Louisiana’s resources, physical threats facing the region, legislation regulating coastal
restoration, and the state agency tasked with the creation of Louisiana’s Coastal Master Plan.
Research within the literature review of Chapter IV explores the first research question:
How does adaptive co-management function as a framework for natural resources planning and
management? This segment provides a prelude to adaptive management by discussing changing
paradigms of democracy and resilience in postindustrial U.S. history. Adaptive co-management
frameworks, limitations, and case studies support recommendations later to come in the text.
4

Key lessons are summarized at the end of the chapter. Data for this segment was gathered
through peer-reviewed scholarly research on adaptive co-management.
The hypothesis in the introduction states that adaptive co-management would constitute a
more effective, sustainable, and democratic form of governance for the management of socialecological systems in coastal Louisiana. The analysis, therefore, must take a three-pronged
approach. First, it must evaluate efficacy as a general master plan. Then it must define and
critique sustainability within a plan. Finally, it must assess democracy in the form of citizen
participation levels and citizen perceptions.
Chapter V evaluates efficacy through a plan critique. The introduction will first follow a
content analysis approach to discern the priorities of the Comprehensive Coastal Master Plan for
a Sustainable Coast. Content analysis is defined as “a research technique for making replicable
and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the context of their use”
(Krippendorff 2004:18). These inferences set the stage for the plan critique, or evaluation.
Evaluation of the 2012 Coastal Master Plan will explore the second research question:
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the 2012 Coastal Master Plan and its policy
framework? It will follow the logic of William C. Baer’s article, “General Plan Evaluation
Criteria: An Approach to Making Better Plans” (2007). Baer emphasizes the importance of
knowing who is conducting the analysis and the status of his or her relationship to the plan
authors. In this case, the evaluator is a professionally and academically trained Urban and
Regional Planner without a personal or professional relationship to primary plan authors. Baer
also questions when the evaluation is undertaken. Because the plan was accepted by the
Louisiana Legislature in March of 2012, mere months before this critique was submitted, a plan
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critique (i.e., as opposed to a post hoc plan outcome evaluation) is the most appropriate form of
evaluation. According to Baer, a plan critique occurs after a plan’s publication, but before it has
had time to be put into practice, and before measurable results have occurred (330). Finally,
Baer refers to the what of the evaluation, which takes various forms:
1) the substance of plan alternatives; and/or
2) the plan as a package—including the document that communicates:
i) goals and objectives
ii) needs or problems
iii) assumptions and methods of reasoning
iv) specific proposals
v) perhaps, implementation devices (ordinances, budgets, etc.) and/or
3) the outcome following plan implementation. (330)
For the 2012 Coastal Master Plan, as critiqued in this thesis, the content area will be the plan as a
package; particularly it will focus on social equity concerns and citizen involvement relative to
the document’s creation. The focus lies in the forces leading to the plan, and not the biophysical
implications of particular coastal restoration techniques.
Furthermore, Baer and his colleagues Jamous and Peloille assert that much of a plan
critique rests on the particular qualities of the planner conducting the evaluation:
The criteria being invoked by the critic are individual, implicit, and somewhat
idiosyncratic, being based on the critic’s individual virtualities—his or her art of
judgment and conceptive powers (Jamous and Peloille 1970; cited in Baer
2007:330-331). The topics covered also depend upon the critic, but include the
three content areas listed above, and usually emphasize the second one—the plan
as document that communicates substance. (Baer 2007:331)
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Here, it is important to clarify that the particular focus of this plan critique rests on the efficacy
of traditional citizen involvement methodologies applied to environmental planning, and general
social equity concerns. Again, the thesis or hypothesis is that the participatory process amounted
to a form of tokenism, which led to an unsustainable plan. In light of the hypothesis, this
particular plan critique sets itself apart from others by virtue of its unique angle.
With this in mind, Baer provides some suggested general criteria for plan assessment,
which will be incorporated in the analysis, and is referenced in full in Chapter V. General
criteria include adequacy of context; “rational model” considerations; procedural validity;
adequacy of scope; guidance for implementation; approach, data, and methodology; quality of
communication; and plan format. Evaluating each question within the general criteria will yield
answers to the second research question: What are the strengths and weaknesses of Louisiana’s
2012 Coastal Master Plan and its policy framework? Within Chapter V, the answer to each
individual question is available. Depending on the answer, each subheading is grouped as a
strength, weakness, or neutral value within a matrix. Qualities are considered neutral if the
answers to the respective question possess qualities of both partial strengths and weaknesses.
The matrix organizes strengths and weaknesses visually, so one can easily estimate the Master
Plan’s level of efficacy as a general plan.
Chapter VI analyzes sustainability through the application of Scott Campbell’s article,
“Green Cities, Growing Cities, Just Cities?: Urban Planning and the Contradictions of
Sustainable Development” (1996). The analysis compares the definitions of sustainability within
the Coastal Master Plan and within Campbell’s article. Again, using content analysis, the
appropriateness of the CPRA’s sustainability definition is contemplated. The balance between
social equity, economic development, and environmental protection, or the “planner’s triangle,”
7

is approximated by categorizing the Master Plan objectives (i.e., social, economic,
environmental) as well as the decision criteria/drivers which satisfy those objectives.
The final analysis—public participation—is located in the second section of Chapter VI.
For this analysis, authority is placed on Sherry Arnstein’s article, “A Ladder of Citizen
Participation” (1969). First, levels of citizen participation are examined, supporting the
hypothesis that the public engagement processes amounted to a form of tokenism. To further
support the claim, key shortcomings of the participation process were described, followed by
“unique” public comments of citizens contained within Appendix G. These comments were
submitted by citizens after the release of the draft plan. Unlike spoken comments at public
hearings or form letters signed by numerous people, unique comments were individual and
unlimited in length.
The public participation analysis required a careful research design strategy. As in
“ideal-typical” qualitative methods strategies, the analysis is made up of (1) qualitative data, (2)
holistic-inductive design of naturalistic inquiry, and (3) content analysis (Patton 2002:248).
Following the themes of qualitative inquiry by Michael Quinn Patton (2002), the data was
presented under purposeful sampling:
Cases for study (e.g., people, organizations, communities, cultures, events, critical
incidences) are selected because they are “information rich” and illuminative, that
is, they offer useful manifestations of the phenomenon of interest; sampling, then,
is aimed at insight about that phenomenon, not empirical generalization from a
sample population. (Patton 2002:40)
Purposeful sampling made sense in this study, since Appendix G, containing all unique public
comments, totaled 774 pages. Additionally, the total number of citizen comments in all forms
was estimated at 2,000. Citing each comment as a full sample set would be overwhelming and
unhelpful, to say the least. Random sampling would bring forth a variety of generally useful
8

topics, but would not be useful to explain the particular phenomenon being studied. Therefore, a
purposeful sampling of comments was used to illuminate the topic of interest—social equity and
participation.
Furthermore, the data collection and fieldwork strategy selected involved qualitative data.
Observations, or rather public comments, “yield detailed, thick description.” The data “capture
direct quotations about people’s personal perspectives and experiences” (40). The data, while in
the form of submitted comments rather than traditional observations of interaction, is naturalistic
because the quotations come from people in natural settings (not a laboratory), and comments are
open-ended (39). Finally, the analysis strategy, according to Patton, would be categorized as
inductive analysis and creative synthesis:
Immersion in the details and specifics of the data to discover important patterns,
themes, and interrelationships; begins by exploring, then confirming; guided by
analytical principles rather than rules; ends with a creative synthesis. (41)
The validity of the research design strategy—purposeful sampling—has to do with the
amount of information contained within each case or opinion. As suggested by Lincoln and
Guba (1985), many of the opinions are presented “to the point of redundancy” (Lincoln and
Guba 1985:202; cited in Patton 2002:246). In other words, multiple comments by different
citizens repeat similar information, and are presented until little new information is forthcoming.
Chapter VII, the final chapter, lists recommendations that will serve to explore the third
research question: How could adaptive co-management reform Louisiana’s Coastal Planning
process? These recommendations are specific to coastal Louisiana and the Coastal Master Plan,
drawing on particular weaknesses of the plan noted in the three analysis sections. The
recommendations, or policy alternatives, listed draw upon the literature review of adaptive comanagement. The chapter then follows with a discussion and conclusions.
9

Chapter III

Background
The people of Southern Louisiana have a personal incentive to fight against wetland
destruction: the existence of their communities and respective livelihoods are threatened, and
time is not on their side. Luckily, coastal communities are not alone in this battle. Local and
regional agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and state and federal departments
form partnerships to mitigate the effects of destructive shoreline practices. In particular, the
Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act (CWPPRA) and Louisiana’s Coastal
Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA) are currently leading planning powers influencing
restoration and protection in the coastal zone. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the
urgent imperative to save Louisiana’s precious shoreline, to provide an overview of the
initiatives of relevant mitigating agencies, to promote understanding of coastal planning
strategies, and to frame the basis of public policy.
America’s Coastal Heartland
Nearly half of Louisiana’s population calls the coast home for its rich culture, vast
beauty, and economic benefits. Residents refer to their coast as a national treasure—America’s
Coastal Heartland. The loss of such a region would be devastating. Nearly one-third of the
Nation’s fisheries come from Louisiana’s coastal waters (BTNEP 2008). Over 400 bird species
visit the region annually, attracting bird enthusiasts from across the nation (LTCC 2012).
Louisiana is the leading producer of shrimp, oysters, and crawfish and the second-leading
producer of finfish and crabs. One-quarter of U.S. oil and gas is produced or moves through
Louisiana’s wetlands, fueling the rest of the nation. A large percentage of imported consumer
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goods travels through Louisiana’s ports. Most of the coffee Americans enjoy passes through the
Port of New Orleans. Additionally, the numerous navigation channels and ports make up nearly
20 percent of the U.S. waterborne commerce (BTNEP 2008).
With respect to waterborne commerce, the Gulf Coast economy owes much of its success
to the Port of South Louisiana, which stretches 54 miles along the Mississippi River. According
the Army Corps of Engineers, it has ranked first in total tonnage for over a dozen years and is the
largest tonnage port in the Western Hemisphere. The Port of South Louisiana along with the
Port of New Orleans are two of the top six ranked principle ports by tonnage (USACE 2010a).
For South Louisiana, the primary commodities are food (47 percent), petroleum products (23
percent), and crude petroleum (9 percent) (USACE 2010b).
The Gulf Coast Region is home to 78 percent of total U.S. shrimp landings, 62 percent of
total U.S. oyster landings, and 16 percent of total U.S. commercial fishery landings.
Approximately 1.4 billion pounds of commercial fishery landings come from the Gulf Coast
Region annually, amounting to $660 million in revenue. Of these Gulf Coast statistics,
Louisiana provides 71 percent of commercial fishing landings and 43 percent of the commercial
fishing value (National Ocean Service, NOAA 2011; National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA
2010). The Gulf Coast Region also provides the nation with 54 percent of its crude oil, 52
percent of its natural gas, and 47 percent of the crude oil refinery capacity (National Ocean
Service, NOAA 2011; Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy 2011).
As a whole, the Gulf of Mexico is the ninth largest water body in the world, and its coast
contains half of the wetlands in the United States. As of 2010, the population of the Gulf Coast
Region has increased by 10,958,081 residents, or 109 percent, since the 1970s (National Ocean
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Service, NOAA 2011; U.S. Census Bureau 2012). The population will continue to grow by an
estimated 15 percent by 2020 (National Ocean Service, NOAA 2011; Woods and Poole
Economics, Inc. 2010). According to NOAA, 84 percent of the area within Louisiana’s parishes
which border the Gulf Coast are located within FEMA V-zones, or Special Flood Hazard Areas
(SFHAs) (National Ocean Service, NOAA 2011). Furthermore, the U.S. Geological Survey
conducts analyses to determine relative vulnerability of coastal areas to sea-level rise-related
erosion, flooding, and storm damage. Assessments for the Gulf Coast Region show that 2,105
miles of the shoreline lie within a very high vulnerability risk category; this includes the entirety
of the Southern Louisiana coast (Thieler and Hammer-Klose 2006).
The Coastal Crisis
The coast of Louisiana is made up of wetlands, a combination of muddy land and sea.
The southernmost part of Louisiana was naturally formed from silt deposits which traveled down
the Mississippi River. Geologists refer to this as the alluvial or deltaic plain. The high ground of
the delta is located along the river channels. When rivers would overflow in the springtime, the
waters would carry a full load of soil. The largest sediments build up closest to the channel
edges. This process builds up natural levees over time. Southern Louisiana’s existence is
attributed to the fact that the Mississippi River deposits silt slightly faster than older silt erodes,
compresses, or decays (Freudenburg 2009:33-34).
For 7,000 years, the Mississippi river has built the coast of Louisiana. Over millennia,
the Mississippi River has shifted, seeking the quickest route to the Gulf of Mexico. As the water
flowed, it deposited sediment along channel edges from the northern states, offsetting annual
subsidence rates. This natural process built the marshes, wetlands, and barrier islands (BTNEP
2008). The process is now being reversed. The Mississippi Delta has been disappearing as a
12

direct result of human interference. By creating levees for flood control (the impetus for which
occurred after the floods of 1927), humans have locked the river in place, expediting erosion
processes (Freudenburg 2009:34).
While the levees held back the silt from reaching Southern Louisiana, old silt deposits
continued to compress and erode, reversing the land-building process, and upsetting the natural
balance of the estuary system. Levee systems were created to protect communities from
inundation and to convey flood waters from upper portions of the Mississippi River to the Gulf
of Mexico. These systems were ultimately successful for all intents and purposes; however, the
levees inadvertently prevented the naturally-occurring, annual overflows of the Mississippi Delta
(BTNEP 2008). Furthermore, the U.S. Geological Survey cites a decline between 70-80 percent
in sediment loads reaching Southern Louisiana after the twentieth century due to the construction
of levees. As a result, Southern Louisiana has been sinking, which subsequently exacerbates the
challenges of flood control (Freudenburg 2009:34).
While levees are the most notable culprits, many other human factors are also to blame
for Louisiana’s land loss. Climate change attributes rising sea levels to melting glaciers and ice
caps in the Arctic. Southern Louisiana, thus, falls below sea level at an even faster rate than ever
before. Scientists also argue that rising oceanic temperatures upgrade storms. Hurricane Katrina
of 2010, for example, was purportedly upgraded to a hurricane from what would have otherwise
remained a tropical storm (Robinson 2005:23). Furthermore, oil exploration and channelization
along the Gulf has catalyzed erosion of the natural wetlands. Canals for barge-mounted
draglines were dredged to provide transport for drilling barges. Through these canals, salt water
has channeled through the wetlands killing salt-intolerant plants and organisms. Among the
many victims are the cypress trees, which were once thriving in the marshes. Once the plants die
13

from water salinity, the root systems no longer exist to hold together the sediment. Over time,
the marshes became more fragile, and the canals had to be dredged to combat the ever-increasing
silt buildup (Robinson 2005:29). This self-reinforcing cycle, man’s attempt to dominate nature,
led to the ecological devastation of one of Southern Louisiana’s most important ecosystems.
Over 40 percent of the wetlands within the U.S. are located in Louisiana. With an annual
loss of 40 square miles of marsh per year, this amounts to 80 percent of the nation’s annual
wetlands loss. Land loss rates are easily comparable to the area equivalent of a football field
every hour (CWPPRA 2012). As the marshes disappear, Louisiana’s southernmost parishes lose
a natural shield against hurricanes and tropical storms. Vegetated wetlands absorb rain like a
sponge, but now they are quickly disappearing (Robinson 2005:29). As land subsides, more of
the developed coast is exposed. Without wetlands, barrier islands, and ridgelands, levees cannot
withhold floodwaters in the event of a serious storm without being raised to higher levels.
Unfortunately, humans cannot build them high enough or quickly enough to protect society from
the effects of hazardous storm surges. Experts now feel that the solution to the coastal crisis now
lies in multiple lines of defense (BTNEP 2008).
The Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act (CWPPRA)
Restoration planning in Louisiana’s Gulf Coast takes place under multiple agencies, and
efforts toward sustainability are touted by many studies and plans. The purpose of this study is
to elucidate upon current policy regimes and answer research questions pertaining to the most
recent master planning efforts within the State. With this in mind, the framework of two of the
most pertinent and influential coastal master planning authorities in Louisiana are examined:
CWPPRA and CPRA.
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In 1990, the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act (CWPPRA) was
federally legislated to identify, prepare, and fund construction of wetlands restoration and
conservation. As of July 2011, 149 CWPPRA coastal restoration projects are active and 91 are
completed, benefiting over 112,000 acres of land in Louisiana. The task force credits itself with
the total protection of 426,000 acres (CWPPRA 2012). Under the CWPPRA program, projects
are evaluated and selected based upon a systematic planning approach. Plans are executed by the
Task Force, which is comprised of the State of Louisiana, acting as the local cost-share sponsor,
and five federal sponsors:
(1) U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) of the U.S. Department of the Interior;
(2) National Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA);
(3) National Marine Fisheries Service of the Department of Commerce (USDC);
(4) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA); and
(5) the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).
The Task Force provides direction and guidance to subordinate organizations through the
Technical Committee. CWPPRA mandates that the Task Force “make final decisions
concerning issues, policies, and procedures necessary to execute the Program and its policies”
(CWPPRA 2011:10). The federal sponsors of the Task Force have four general responsibilities.
First, they “assure that funds spent on a project are spent in accordance with the project’s cost
sharing agreement and the CWPPRA.” The agreement currently states that the federal sponsors
must provide 85 percent of project funding, and the State (aka local sponsor) must provide a
match of 15 percent (CWPPRA 2011:6). Secondly, they “perform any audits of the local
sponsor’s credits for the projects as required by the project’s cost-sharing agreement and the
15

individual agency’s regulations.” Additionally, “the federal sponsor shall provide the local
sponsor with an annual statement of prior State fiscal year expenditures in a format agreeable to
the local and federal sponsor by no later than September 30 of each year.” Finally, “each
quarter, federal sponsors will review funds within each approved project under their purview and
determine whether funds may be returned to the Task Force…Funds may be returned to the Task
Force by [a] simple deobligation process” (CWPPRA 2011:10).
The title of funds administrator falls upon the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE),
with its central office in New Orleans. USACE general responsibilities include the following:
(1) to use Corps of Engineers financial accounting procedures;
(2) to manage the funds for the project;
(3) to disburse project funds as requested by the Federal Sponsor;
(4) to regularly report to the agencies and the local sponsor on the status of the project
accounts;
(5) by August 31 of each year, furnish each federal sponsor with a report on project
expenditures for the last State fiscal year;
(6) by the 20th of the month following the end of a fiscal quarter, the Corps of Engineers will
prepare and furnish all the agencies and local sponsor a report on the status of funding
and cost sharing for each of their projects; and
(7) to provide program management duties, e.g. PPL reports, minutes of meetings,
distribution of planning documents, etc. (CWPPRA 2011:5).
Additionally, the Chairman of the Task Force is the District Commander of the USACE New
Orleans District. The Chairman “provides administration, management, and oversight of the
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Planning and Construction Programs, and acts as accountant, budgeter, administrator, and
disburser of all Federal and non-Federal funds under the Act.” The Chairman also “acts as the
official manager of financial data and most information relating to the CWPPRA Program and
projects” (CWPPRA 2011:10).
The Technical Committee is an advisory board to the Task Force, and decisions are made
in consideration of Technical Committee recommendations. The Task Force charges the
Technical Committee “to consider and shape decisions and proposed actions of the [Planning
and Evaluation Subcommittee] (P&E), regarding its position on issues, policy, and procedures
towards execution of the Program and projects.” The TC “makes directives for action to the
P&E, and the TC makes decisions in consideration of P&E recommendations. The
responsibilities of the TC include the annual review of the outreach budget and the Public
Outreach Committee’s strategic plan” (CWPPRA 2011:11).
The Planning and Evaluation Subcommittee (P&E), established by Technical Committee,
is the working level committee made up of special technical workgroups. It is tasked with
assisting in “developing policies and processes,” and “recommending procedures for formulating
plans and projects to accomplish the goals and mandates of CWPPRA” (CWPPRA 2011:11).
Under direction of the P&E are the Environmental Workgroup (EnvWG), Engineering
Workgroup (EngWG), and the Economic Workgroup (EcoWG). “EnvWG, under the guidance
and direction of the P&E, reviews candidate projects to: (1) suggest any recommended measures
and features that should be considered during engineering design for the achievement and/or
enhancement of wetland benefits, and (2) determine the estimated annualized wetland benefits
(Average Annual Habitat Units) of those projects” (CWPPRA 2011:11). EngWG “provides
engineering standards, quality control/assurance, and support for the review and comment for:
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engineering, environmental compliance (cultural resources, NEPA, and HTRW), economic, real
estate, construction, construction supervision and inspection, project management, operation and
maintenance, and monitoring, of candidate and demonstration projects considered for
development, selection, and funding under the Act” (CWPPRA 2011:11-12). EcoWG “reviews
and evaluates candidate projects that have been completely developed, for the purpose of
assigning the fully funded first cost of the projects, based on the estimated 20-year stream of
project costs” (CWPPRA 2011:12).
The Priority Project List (PPL) is a list of restoration projects scheduled for
implementation. Public participation occurs at the local level as potential projects are being
proposed. In Louisiana, each parish has a Coastal Zone Administrator (CZA), who acts as a
representative for project proposals within the region. Once the CZAs submit potential
restoration projects to CWPPRA, plans are sorted by Regional Planning Teams (RPTs). These
teams are made up of staff from federal agencies which represent a particular coastal region.
RPTs select very few projects to proceed in the selection process. This could amount to only
five to ten projects for each region. Then, selected projects go to the Technical Committee,
made up of State and Federal staff members, which selects proposed projects from all RPTs
(Peyronnin 2011).
Under CWPPRA, two annual meetings are mandated for the purposes of budgeting. In
October, the TF meets to select demonstration projects and candidate projects selected for phase
1 funding from the annual Project Priorities List (PPL). After considering the recommendations
of the TC, the TF may approve phase 2 funding in January (CWPPRA 2011:12). During the
preliminary assessment of nominated projects, the P&E Subcommittee will prepare a matrix of
cost estimates and other pertinent information for nominees and demonstration project nominees.
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This information then goes to the TC and the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority. PPL
projects are reviewed by the TC, which considers project costs and potential wetland benefits.
Ten are selected for further review by the Environmental, Engineering, and Economic Work
Groups. Up to three demonstration projects are also selected for a more detailed assessment
(CWPPRA 2011:29-33).
Louisiana’s Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA)
The 2012 Coastal Master Plan, known formally as Louisiana’s Comprehensive Master
Plan for a Sustainable Coast, was created by the State agency, Coastal Protection and Restoration
Authority (CPRA). Following a critical need as a result of Hurricanes Rita and Katrina, the
Louisiana Legislature’s First Extraordinary Session of 2005 created the CPRA under Act 8. It
directed the state to create a sustainable plan for the entire coast, which was to be updated every
five years and was to utilize the science and innovation to the maximum capacity (CPRA
2012a:24).
As in most agencies, CPRA also follows an organizational hierarchy for the purposes of
decision-making. The Planning Team, made up of 33 CPRA employees and advisory
consultants, was responsible for developing the Master Plan. Other boards, committees, focus
groups, and panels advised the Planning Team. The Science and Engineering Board (10
members) was made up of national and international experts who participated in five multi-day
meetings and 13 webinars. The Technical Advisory Committees were three to four-member
groups tasked with advising the state on how to conduct the analysis in the most technically
sound manner. These included committees advising on the best use of the planning tool,
modeling, and cultural heritage (10 members total). The Framework Development Team was
made up of 33 representatives from business and industry, federal, state, and local governments,
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nongovernmental institutions, and coastal institutions. Additionally, three Focus Groups were
created: the Navigation Focus Group (18 members), the Oil and Gas Focus Group (8 members),
the Fisheries Focus Group (16 members), Predictive Modeling Workgroups (61 members total),
the Subsidence Advisory Panel (7 members), and the Marsh Collapse Advisory Panel (6
members).
The first master plan was finalized in 2007. Since then, CPRA has credited itself with
having done the following:
(1) Built or improved 159 miles of levees
(2) Benefited 19,405 acres of coastal habitat
(3) Secured approximately $17 billion in state and federal funding for protection and
restoration projects
(4) Identified and used dozens of different federal, state, local, and private funding
sources for projects
(5) Moved over 150 projects into design and construction
(6) Constructed projects in 20 parishes
(7) Constructed 32 miles of barrier islands/berms. (CPRA 2012:25)
In a collaborative effort, CPRA reviewed projects and recommendations from prior studies and
plans. The Comprehensive Project List included approximately 1,500 restoration and protection
projects. Previously completed plans which contributed to this list included the following:
(1) 2007 Coastal Master Plan
(2) A Dutch Perspective on Coastal Louisiana Flood Risk Reduction and Landscape
Stabilization
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(3) A Plan to Sustain Coastal Louisiana Using the Multiple Lines of Defense Strategy
(4) Barataria-Terrebonne National Estuary Program Comprehensive Conservation and
Management Plan
(5) Coast 2050:Toward a Sustainable Coastal Louisiana
(6) Coastal Impact Assistance Program Tier II Projects
(7) Coastal Sustainability Studio Concepts
(8) Coastal Wetland Planning, Protection, and Restoration Act Finalists
(9) Comprehensive Habitat Management Plan for The Lake Pontchartrain Basin
(10)

Envisioning the Future of the Gulf Coast

(11)

Louisiana Coastal Area Comprehensive Study

(12)

Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Final Technical Report

(13)

Mississippi River Gulf Outlet Ecosystem Restoration Study

(14)

Mississippi River Sediment, Nutrient, and Freshwater Distribution Study

(15)

Parish Master Plans (St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, Terrebonne, St. Mary,

Vermilion)
(16)

Southwest Coastal Louisiana Feasibility Study

(17)

Third Delta Phase II Reconnaissance Study

The project list was paired down by eliminating duplicate projects, combing small
projects into larger projects, removing projects that were not large enough for the Master Plan
models to reasonably evaluate, and removing projects that did not include enough specific
information to be adequately evaluated using the models (65). In addition to the collaboration
with these prior plans and studies, the Master Plan supports CWPPRA projects which are in line
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with its objectives and principles. CPRA claims it will not cost share projects that are in conflict
with the master plan (167).
CPRA then developed a list of 397 projects for evaluation including restoration projects,
structural risk projects, and non-structural risk-reduction projects. The 248 restoration projects
can be categorized as barrier island/headland restoration, hydrologic restoration, marsh creation,
oyster barrier reefs, ridge restoration, sediment diversion, channel realignment, bank
stabilization, and shoreline protection (68-69). Structural protection projects include earthen
levees, concrete walls, floodgates, and pumps (70). Nonstructural protection projects include
elevation, flood proofing, and voluntary acquisition (72).
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Chapter IV

Introduction of the Literature Review
Sustainability of the environment depends upon an equal balance between environmental,
social, and economic considerations. Each of these elements is complex in and of itself,
compounding the challenges of integration furthermore. In a planning and natural resource
management context, governance literature has converged upon a solution with a central focus
on collaboration: adaptive co-management. This chapter will first discuss the challenges facing
democracy in planning, the ecosystem-based approach, and the evolution of adaptive and
collaborative management leading up to the convergence of adaptive co-management. Then, it
will focus on the analytical framework of adaptive co-management, overcoming its limitations,
and relevant case study outcomes. In doing so, it will explore the first research question: How
does adaptive co-management function as a framework for natural resources planning and
management?
Science, Democracy, and Ecological Resilience
Postindustrialism ushered in a new era of American democracy, or lack thereof as some
critics argue. As opposed to the gossamer reminders of an older regime (i.e. “of the people, by
the people, for the people”), the information society now celebrates science and technology as a
superior decision-making mechanism (Fischer 2000:10). When “technically trained experts rule
by virtue of their specialized knowledge and position in dominant political and economic
institutions” (Fischer 1990), technocracy overtakes democracy. While some believe the
complexity of our contemporary world has become too great, others remain wary of the pitfalls
of reductionist science. For Gunderson (2003), rigid scientific approaches fail when focusing on
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the wrong types of uncertainty, erroneously assuming a system near equilibrium, only examining
parts of a whole system, or holistically searching for simple structures to explain complexity.
Armitage et al. (2009:95) further note that efforts to resolve social-ecological dilemmas have
erroneously focused on the roles of science, overcoming information gaps, and the construction
of models.
The discourse then turns to the integration of science and democracy. Contemporary
governance literature advocates for the utilization of expertise to facilitate learning and
collaboration in participatory methods. To avoid the dismissal of democracy as a paradigm
useful only to past societies, we must understand that expert advice is open to different
interpretations, thus, facilitating a “politics of expertise” (Fischer 1990:111).
Despite the historically rising managerial empiricism germane to most policy decisions,
the utility of citizen participation has always been a large component of the discourse on social
research and engagement. Of vital importance is the foundational understanding that not all
participatory methods are equal. In 1969, Sherry Arnstein created a typology of eight levels of
participation. Her illustrative diagram, a “ladder of citizen participation,” labels eight rungs in
order by extent of citizens’ power: manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, placation,
partnership, delegated power, and citizen control. She further categorized manipulation and
therapy as nonparticipation. The middle three rungs consisted of tokenism, and the top three
rungs amounted to citizen power (Arnstein 1969). In an increasingly technological world,
citizens are more challenged than ever before in contributing meaningful input to complex
planning processes. The challenges are compounded further when the planning process is
environmental, where the concepts of ecology, geology, and resource management are intricate,
technical, and interwoven.
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The very complexity of science-based approaches is apparent even in basic
conceptualizations of ecological crises. In ecological systems, for instance, resilience can be
defined depending upon different aspects of stability (Holling 1973; Gunderson 2003). In the
first definition, known as engineering resilience (Holling 1996; Gunderson 2003), ecological
systems are assumed to exist in a stable steady-state, where resilience is described by a return
time to steady state following a perturbation (Pimm1984; O’Neil et al. 1986; Gunderson 2003).
The stable-state, while desirable in the face of abrupt change, tends to be less achievable than
ever before as a consequence of human actions (Folke et al. 2005:442). It is more common for
those from traditions of applied mathematics and resource ecology to subscribe to the second
definition of ecological resilience (Walker et al. 1969; Gunderson 2003), where instabilities can
flip a system into another stability domain (Holling 1973; Gunderson 2003). Under this
classification, resilience is defined as the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before
the system redefines its structure by changing the variables and processes that control behavior.
The redefinition of structure, or regime change, is thought to be a vulnerability which poses
challenges to society (Folke et al. 2005:442).
Furthermore, ecological change can be abrupt or gradual. Experiences informing
understanding are incomplete, consequences are ambiguous, and future dynamics are unclear.
Historically, it has been a rarity in resource management theory to fully acknowledge
interactions across scales, instead favoring single issues and steady-state regimes (Folke et al.
2005:442). Traditional “command-and-control” regimes, relying on scientific inquiry, fall
victim to the limitations of reductionism and disciplinary isolation in a world of surprise and
constant change (Levin 1999; Armitage et al. 2009). The importance of a more holistic
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approach, integrating multiple factors across spatial and temporal scales into the study of
ecological systems, is becoming more apparent.
The new express focus of resource managers becomes an ecosystem’s capacity to
maintain essential ecological processes as opposed to securing maximum sustainable yields.
This is commonly known as the ecosystem-based approach (Folke et al. 2005:443). To Berkes
and Folke (2002), it is the management of social-ecological systems, a connotation of the human
integration in natural systems. Generally accepted is Berkes’ conceptualization of socialecological systems as “complex adaptive systems,” noting “issues of scale, uncertainty, nonlinear behavior, self-organization, and multiple stability domains” (Berkes et al. 2003; Harris
2007; Berkes 2010). To Lee (1993:57), the basic approach is the focus on the bioregion, where
“seeing the ecosystem as a whole must precede efforts to manage it” (cited in Huitema et al.
2009). Regardless of its name, the goal is the same: a shift in knowledge generation in favor of
the whole system.
The Evolution of Adaptive Co-Management
The theoretical foundations of adaptive co-management emerged gradually. Holling first
popularized the concept of adaptive management in its capacity for natural resource management
in his 1978 publication, Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management. Its legitimacy
was again reinforced by Walters’ 1986 report, Adaptive Management of Renewable Resources
(cited in Stankey, Clark, & Bormann 2005). Adaptive management is particularly notable in its
capacity for change and reorganization. Under this management paradigm, social capital (i.e.,
networks, leadership, and trust) and social memory are important sources of resilience (Folke et
al. 2005:444). The concepts of continuous updates and adjustments to knowledge are
foundational, where each action is viewed as an opportunity for learning. Policies become
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hypotheses and management actions are experiments (Folke et al. 2005:447). For Lee (1993,
1999), institutional prescriptions for adaptive management include collaboration,
experimentation, and a bioregional approach (Huitema et al. 2009). Within a similar vein, Folke
et al.(2005) note that the three highly important processes of adaptive governance are
participation, collective action, and learning.
Historically, organizational literature on social learning has been extremely relevant to
adaptive management. Double feedback loops consider extant assumptions, norms, and
objectives of traditional mental models (Armitage et al. 2009), and often lead to fundamental
changes in behavior (Berkes 2009). In this social learning process, participants monitor
outcomes of a particular plan, identify problems, evaluate effectiveness, and provide reflection,
leading to the next iteration (Berkes 2009). The literature suggests that the non-linear nature of
social-ecological feedback requires horizontal and vertical linkages among social actors in
pursuit of social learning (Young 2002; Ostrom 2005; Armitage et al. 2009:96). Furthermore,
governance literature suggests the legitimacy, accountability, and effectiveness of adaptive
management (Folke et al. 2005:449).
Co-management entered the natural resource manager’s lexicon as a result of case study
experiences of the 1980s (Plummer & Armitage 2007; Plummer & Fennell 2007; Berkes 2009).
Simply put, it is the joint management of the commons (Carlsson & Berkes 2005). Also termed
collaborative management, it can be reduced to a power sharing arrangement between the State
and the community. Collaboration implies that government bodies work together to manage
issues across jurisdictional boundaries and collaborate with non-governmental stakeholders such
as citizens and interest groups (Huitema et al. 2009). Furthermore, Pinkerton differentiates
between two models of co-management, which she refers to as folk-managed systems or state
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managed systems. She posits that a horizontal continuum exists, ranging from “nearly total selfmanagement to nearly total state management.” She also notes a “vertical contracting out model
of state management” power, a devolution of rights (Pinkerton 1994:322-35; cited in Carlsson &
Berkes 2005).
No single formal structure exists, and the process of negotiation, deliberation, and
problem-solving is an eternal process. Therefore, function rather than form tends to be the focus
of co-management literature. Emphasizing this approach, Carlsson and Berkes (2005) explain
that power-sharing is actually the result, not the starting point (65). Co-management may be a
good approach to organizational development, with its potential for “enhanced equality and
efficiency in decision-making, broader based legitimization for actions, and increased capacity at
a local scale” (Plummer & Armitage 2007:63).
The marriage of adaptive management and co-management results in a flexible,
cooperative form of ecosystem governance, adaptive co-management. While adaptive
management literature has focused on learning and experimentation, co-management literature
has emphasized the sharing of power and responsibility. The literature now converges to the
process of adaptive co-management, speaking to the challenges of social-ecological systems
management (Olsson, Folke, & Berkes 2004; Armitage et al. 2007; Huitema et al. 2009).
Processes are collaborative and community-based, with the built-in ability to adapt to
change in specific regions—the best of both worlds. Simply put, learning characteristics of
adaptive management are merged with collaborative governance. It can best be defined as “a
process by which institutional arrangements and ecological knowledge are tested and revised in a
dynamic, ongoing self-organized process of trial-and-error” (Folke et al. 2002:8). Adaptive co-
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management is also described as the “public and private interactions undertaken to resolve
societal challenges, and the institutions and principles which mediate those actions” (Kooiman &
Bavinck 2005; Armitage et al. 2009:95).
Adaptive co-management operates under the subsidiary principle, where effective user
participation and problem solving is achieved at the lowest feasible level of organization
(Kooiman 2003; Berkes 2010). This is especially true for some developing countries which have
experienced devolution. No longer bound by central government, local-level management
follows a grassroots, bottom-up planning approach (Berkes 2010).
Like co-management, it is a problem-solving process orchestrated through power-sharing
arrangements (Carlsson & Berkes 2005; Folke 2005:448). Adaptive co-management links
stakeholders at different levels: local users and municipalities, regional and national
organizations, and international bodies. Within these collaborations are often smaller linkages of
multiple institutions. The “facilitation by rules and incentives” in combination with the “selforganizing process of adaptive co-management” (Olsson et al. 2004a:87), “has the potential to
make…social-ecological systems more robust to change” (Armitage et al. 2009; cited in
Plummer & Armitage 2007).
Analytical Framework
While no single institutional arrangement defines an adaptive co-management regime,
contemporary governance literature notes themes, principles, and strategies that contribute to the
analytical framework of an adaptive co-management case study. Armitage et al. (2009) outline
five thematic areas of adaptive co-management: institutions, incentives, and governance;
learning through complexity; power asymmetries; assessment; and linking to policy. Similarly
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in Berkes’ conceptualization, he refers to the “many faces of co-management:” as power sharing,
as institution building, as trust and social capital, as process, as problem solving, and as
governance (Berkes 2009:1693).
Dietz et al. (2003) noted three strategies for successful management of the commons.
First is the analytic deliberation among all parties. When key participants are not involved in the
institutional design, when there is a lack of trust-building, and a consensus is not reached, comanagement will fail (Berkes et al. 2007). Second is that “institutional arrangements must be
complex, redundant, and nested in layers” (Dietz et al. 2003:1910; cited in Berkes et al. 2007).
This is a key concept for collaborative organizations. Third is that “governance should employ
mixtures of institutional types (e.g., hierarchies, markets, and community self-governance)”
(Dietz et al. 2003:1910; cited in Berkes et al. 2007).
Huitema et al. (2009) reviewed the literature on institutional prescriptions specific to
adaptive water governance. They found that the text is replete with references to polycentric
governance, where “political authority is dispersed to separately constituted bodies with
overlapping jurisdictions that do not stand in hierarchical relationship to each other” (Skelcher
2005:89). Berkes notes that high levels of uncertainty and complexity within social-ecological
systems result in difficulty by any one entity to possess the full range of knowledge necessary for
environmental governance. Thus, governance research has shifted toward devolution models
(i.e., co-management) where knowledge is shared among local, regional, national, and
international groups. Polycentric governance reduces vulnerability for three reasons: (1) It has
the capacity to deal with issues of multiple geographical scopes at different scales; (2) It has a
high degree of overlap and redundancy, where multiple units can take over another’s function if
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one fails; (3) The use of multiple units provides the capacity for experimentation and group
learning (Ostrom 2005:181-182; Huitema et al. 2009).
Another institutional prescription is public participation. Governance literature touts the
benefits, where participation opens up the decision-making process and makes better use of
information and creativity available to society. It also increases public understanding and
transparency, and prompts collaboration between government bodies (Huitema et al. 2009).
The third institutional prescription, according to Huitema et al., is experimentation. This
is a management-based approach where information is hypothetical and management serves as a
form of hypothesis-testing. Literature is both positive and critical, bringing to question the
results of such learning. Finally, Huitema et al. (2009) discuss the focus of the last institutional
prescription: the bioregional perspective. The authors note that, in watershed management, the
bioregion crosses administrative boundaries, and should be approached at the basin level (i.e.,
“the river-basin approach,” “the water systems approach,” “integrated water resources
management,” or “ICM”). Implicit is the watershed collaborative which must be created among
jurisdictions.
Fabricius et al. (2007) discovered three types of communities involved in ecosystem
management. First are what they called powerless spectators, named for their lack of
empowerment and capacity, often due to external circumstances out of their control. Second are
those with the capacity to respond, but lack of knowledge and institutions for social learning.
These are called coping actors. Finally there are adaptive co-managers:
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A third type of community has both the capacity to respond to and deal with
change, and possess institutions for social learning. They take a longer term
perspective in dealing with threats and their adaptive strategies focus on
sustainable development. They frequently collaborate with other groups and
constantly invest in their own capacity, and that of the ecosystem to deal with
change. (Fabricius et al. 2007:5)
Another emerging theme in adaptive co-management literature is the need for the engaging
participatory approaches, social learning mechanisms, and adaptive governance networks in
adaptive collaborative risk management, a tool for climate change adaptation (May & Plummer
2011).
Inherent in the collaborative nature of adaptive co-management is the acknowledgment
that multiple types of sources and knowledge are important (Armitage et al. 2009). Much of the
present-day literature on social-ecological systems has noted the need for a combination of
professional expertise with traditional ecological knowledge (TEK), gathered by indigenous
peoples through generations of practice (Folke et al. 2005:446). Traditional communities
possess fine-grained, contextual ecosystem knowledge through direct experience. This
knowledge has evolved through generations of experimentation and trial and error, and can be
incorporated into ecosystem management policies and strategies (Fabricius et al. 2007). In
living with the land, they are the first to notice change in the environment. Berkes further notes
that communities are important decision makers in management of the commons because they
affect ecosystems at all scales (Berkes 2006).
Minding the recent criticisms of adaptive co-management outcomes, Plummer and
Armitage (2007) acknowledge the importance in the incorporation of evaluative frameworks
built in to the process. Looking through the lens of resilience, Plummer and Armitage proposed
an evaluative framework made up of three components: an ecological component, a livelihoods
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component, and a process component. Traditionally, environmental analysis requires both the
consideration of natural capital and its function in regulating ecosystem stability as well as its
provision of resources for humans (Elkins et al. 2003:170; Plummer & Armitage 2007:67).
Here, the ecological component of Plummer and Armitage’s framework considers the former
component of ecosystem function and natural sustainability, where the latter utility as a source
and sink for humans is part of the process component. The livelihoods component is used to
conceptualize complex economic, social, ecological, and behavioral choices, and is often used to
evaluate economics and incentives in the context of co-management outcomes (Plummer &
Armitage 2007:68).
Overcoming the Limitations of Adaptive Co-Management
The implementation of adaptive co-management, though successful in numerous
applications, is no simple task. Conflict arises where multiple stakeholders have interest in the
same pool of resources, and management is internally divided: “Competing interests and values
are the norm, and conflict is a frequent operating condition, while social relationships and rules
regarding use and management are complex” (Armitage et al. 2009:96).
The fundamental adaptive co-management element of participation, according to Brody
(2003), faces risks of conflicting interests, slowing down decision-making processes. These
contradictions result in “unfortunate compromises between biodiversity conservation and
economic development” (cited in Schultz, Duit, & Folke 2010:663). Adaptive governance
literature indicates that adaptive co-management serves to assuage internal conflicts among
stakeholders and redirects the focus to problem resolution concerning ecosystems. Many
authors, however, emphasize the inevitable power struggles and political conflict within
environmental decision making. Voß and Bornemann (2011), furthermore, argue that reflexive
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governance is overly idealized and sidesteps issues of political conflict: “These ‘nasty politics’
are practically excluded (e.g., by the requirement to leave guns at the door) or sidestepped by an
optimistic language that highlights the ‘smooth’ sides of knowledge production and learning.”
Evaluating devolution literature in relation to co-management, Berkes (2010) finds that
decentralization experiments often fail to meet objectives: “…the list of objectives has grown far
beyond administrative efficiency of delivering services closer to the people, to include
participatory development and democratization in general, along with empowerment, poverty
reduction, and resource sustainability” (496). Furthermore, Nadasdy (2003) argues that existent
inequalities are reinforced when adaptive co-management processes fail to attend to the political
economy. Others find that the lack of information on social and economic goals undermines the
integrity of community-based natural resource management processes (Kellert et al. 2000).
Plummer and Armitage (2007) find that critics are often skeptical of the circumvention of
regulations and lack of accountability in decision-making processes devolved by the government.
Additionally, they cite the “power imbalances and co-option, exclusion of the general public, and
perpetuation of narrow interests” (Plummer & Armitage 2007:63).
To contest the many criticisms of participatory action, Schultz, Duit, and Folke (2011)
created a quantitative evaluation of adaptive co-management performance from 146 Biosphere
Reserves across 55 countries. The features of Biosphere Reserves are very closely linked with
those of adaptive co-management: a focus on monitoring, an integrated approach to conservation
and development, and recommendations of adaptive management and participation of a
sustainable range of actors. Utilizing survey responses of coordinators, directors, and managers
of the Biosphere Reserves, and conducting OLS regressions, Schultz, Duit, and Folke found
support for a number of hypotheses. Participation of scientists in implementation somewhat
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added to perceived credibility of BR implementation. The study also found that high
participation levels of local resource users and inhabitants contributed to higher levels of
perceived effectiveness of sustainable development goals (666).

Overall, the authors concluded

that the integration of biodiversity conservation and sustainable development through
participation of stakeholders does not have a negative effect on conservation effectiveness; yet,
they claim that it is not a panacea for improvement either (668).
Lessons from Case Study Literature
Successful adaptive co-management case studies provide insight into applied
mythologies of collaborative social and institutional linkages. Over the past few decades,
adaptive co-management arrangements have been appearing, evolving, and gaining attention.
Perhaps two of the more prominent case studies today include the Kristianstads Vattenrike of
Southern Sweden and the Inuvialuit Region of the Canadian North.
Adaptive co-management emerged in the wetlands ecosystem of Southern Sweden, a
Biosphere Reserve, over the span of a decade. The Kristianstad Vattenrike roughly translating to
“the Kristianstad Water Realm” (Olsson, Folke, & Hahn 2004:4), includes the Helgeå River
catchment area and the coastal regions of Hanö Bay within the Municipality of Kristianstad. As
a part of the ecosystem management methodology, a new collaborative municipal organization
was established in 1989: the Ecomuseum Kristianstads Vattenrike (EKV) (1,6). Interviews of
members involved in the EKV indicated that its successful formation depended upon a key
individual, or steward (See Table 1) (Pinkerton 1998; Berkes & Folke 2002; Westley 2002;
Olsson, Folke, & Hahn 2004). This individual began as an employee of the county museum, but
later saw a need for an integration of social actors to manage local resources and fit strategies to
match the scale of environmental problems (Olsson et al. 2007:5).
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For the Kristianstads Vattenrike, traditional conservation plans and policies of the 1980s
were not effective. In the lower catchment of the Helgeå River, inhabitants cited declining bird
populations, eutrophication and overgrowth of lakes, and a decrease in the use of flooded
meadows for haymaking and grazing (Olsson, Folke, & Hahn 2004:6). The EKV serves as a
facilitator and coordinator in local collaborative processes, involving “international associations,
national, regional, and local authorities, researchers, non-profit associations, and landowners to
maintain and restore the natural and cultural values of the area” (See Table 1) (Olsson, Folke, &
Hahn 2004:7). It reports to the municipality board, but holds no formal authority to make or
enforce rules.
According to Olsson, Folke, and Hahn (2004), the transformation of governance involved
three distinct phases: preparing the system for change, seizing a window of opportunity, and
building social-ecological resilience of the new desired state (See Table 1). As such, the “local
policy entrepreneur initiated trust-building dialogue, mobilized social networks with actors
across scales, and started processes for coordinating people, information flows and ongoing
activities, and for compiling and generating knowledge, understanding, and management policies
for ecosystem dynamics” (Olsson, Folke, & Hahn 2004:1). Drawing further upon previous EKV
research, Olsson et al. (2007) presented two features that link organizations across multiple
levels: the role of bridging organizations and the importance of leadership (Olsson et al. 2007:1).
From the EKV of Southern Sweden, we learn that individual actors can emerge as leaders to
facilitate innovative, collaborative arrangements.
Co-management arrangements in Northern Canada paralleled the emergence of
Aboriginal land claims agreements. In this case, management boards and joint committees were
the institutional structures mandated by such agreements (See Table 1). For example, Article 5,
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Part II of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreements specifies membership of the Nunavat Wildlife
Management Board, the board’s bylaws, powers, duties, and responsibilities (Berkes & Fast
2005:10-11). Additionally, Section 14 establishes four co-management institutions, including
one for fisheries and marine mammal management, the Fisheries Joint Management Committee
(FJMC) (Fast, Mathias, & Banias 2001; cited in Berkes & Fast 2005:11).
Additionally, the Oceans Act (Canada 1997) was a direct attempt to utilize comanagement arrangements to manage coastal and oceanic resources (See Table 1). This Act was
the first of its kind, making Canada the first in the world with comprehensive oceans legislation,
with objectives for a) understanding and protecting the marine environment; b) supporting
sustainable economic opportunities; and c) international leadership (Canada’s Oceans Strategy
2002).
The Inuit of Canada’s new Territory of Nunavat particularly harvest Arctic char for
subsistence and employment. Partnering with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO)
managers, the Inuit approached co-management informally at first. Later, the Nunavat Land
Claims Agreement of 1993 legislated co-management within the Nunavuit Territory
(Kristofferson & Berkes 2005:250). By utilizing local knowledge of the resources, adaptive comanagement allows for the traditional management techniques of the Inuit to mix with and
enrich the conventional management techniques, based upon scientific methods (See Table 1).
Natural resources management scholars Kristofferson and Berkes conclude that legislated
adaptive co-management “offers a potentially effective way to manage the Arctic char resource,
while simultaneously providing optimum socio-economic benefits to resource users” (266).
Undoubtedly, the sheer complexity of Arctic char stock elicits a collaborative approach.
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All in all, regions beginning to implement adaptive co-management principles may take
note of these exemplary cases. From Southern Sweden and Canada come fundamental lessons.
Co-management institutions may come about formally or informally. Organizational authority
may be mandated, or boards may hold an advisory capacity. While the structure of comanagement institutions may differ among cases, what really matters is function, not form. Key
approaches summarized below from the case study literature will influence the analysis of and
recommendations for Louisiana’s Coastal Master Plan:

•
•
•
•

Southern Sweden
Sometimes a key individual or steward can start the process.
The collaborative process can include international associations, national, regional, and
local authorities, researchers, non-profit associations, and landowners.
Organizations may not have formal authority, but may report to a higher municipality.
Three phases of transformation are preparing the system for change, seizing a window
of opportunity, and building social-ecological resilience of the desired state.

Canada
• Management boards, committees, and other co-management institutions can be
mandated by land claims agreements.
• Federal legislation (i.e., Canada's Oceans Act) can utilize co-management arrangements
to manage coastal and oceanic resources.
• Co-management arrangements including indigenous peoples allow for the mixture of
traditional and conventional management practices.
Table 1. Key findings of leading adaptive co-management case studies.
Sources:
Southern Sweden: Pinkerton 1998; Berkes & Folke 2002; Westley 2002; Olsson, Folke, & Hahn 2004;
Olsson et al. 2007
Canada: Fast, Mathias, & Banias 2001; Canada’s Ocean Strategy 2002; Berkes & Fast 2005;
Kristofferson & Berkes 2005
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Chapter V

Analysis of the Plan Critique
The introduction of the Louisiana 2012 Coastal Master Plan, for the purposes of content
analysis, is of extreme importance. The introduction quickly gives its readers an idea of the most
valuable qualities of the coast and the state’s topmost priorities in the eyes of the planners. The
Comprehensive Coastal Master Plan of 2012 is an update to the version compiled in 2007. Since
2008, the Master Plan credits itself with progress, including 159 miles of built or improved
levees, 19,405 acres of coastal habitats benefited, and $17 billion in State and Federal funding
for protection and restoration (CPRA 2012a:22). From its introductory paragraphs, the plan
subtly reveals a predisposition toward certain restoration priorities:
We developed the plan by taking a look 50 years into south Louisiana’s future and
building world class science and engineering expertise into understanding what
we can achieve…Since the 2007 Master Plan was released, we have built more
levees, restored more land, and invested more dollars than anytime in the state’s
history. (28)
Here, we notice that a great amount of authority is placed on physical science to make restoration
decisions. Additionally, we see that value is placed on the number of levees constructed, land
restored, and dollars spent. These components are easily visible to the public; they are
quantitative building blocks representing elements of progress. To satisfy a quantitative
approach, the plan assumed a moderate scenario of future coastal conditions and cited a $5.3
billion decrease in expected annual damages over 50 years if the plan is implemented.
As described in the methodology, the plan evaluation follows the suggested general
criteria for plan assessment of William C. Baer’s article, “General Plan Evaluation Criteria: An
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Approach to Making Better Plans” (2007). Baer’s evaluation criteria, as presented in Figure 1,
assess professional expertise, including the plan as a document communicating methodology,
reasoning, and content (Baer 2007:337). Part of his philosophy to judge plan competency is to
guard against serious errors and omissions, and to set down criteria for a bad plan in order to
determine criteria for a good plan. He also gives credence to professionally approved standards.
These are exemplified by the set of criteria in California’s Planning Law Analysis and Test
Organizer (PLATO) (Governor’s Office of Planning and Research 1990b) and the State of
California General Guidelines (Governor’s Office of Planning and Research 1990a).
Additionally, Baer accounts for changing legal expectations, leading to mandates for better
documentation of a plan’s purpose. The claim that a plan is in the public’s best interest must be
backed by evidence (Baer 2007:337).
The purpose of this analysis is to set up a standardized framework for general evaluation
before considering the plan in light of sustainability theory. Results of the general plan critique
are embedded within the evaluation section of each general criterion in the following pages. In
doing so, the critique explores the first research question: What are the strengths and weaknesses
of the 2012 Coastal Master Plan and its policy framework?
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Figure 1. Baer's suggested general criteria for plan assessment (Baer 2007).
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Figure 1 continued
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Plan Evaluation
1) Adequacy of Context. (Explain the context and setting: the what and the why of the
document. They are not self-evident to the public.)
a. Is the political/legal context of the plan explained (e.g., meeting state mandates,
public discussion and consideration, top priority issues)?
Evaluation: On page 24, the plan describes the formation of the CPRA by
the Louisiana Legislature during the First Extraordinary Session of 2005.
It also describes CPRA’s direction to develop a plan for a safe and
sustainable coast. Top priority issues include land loss and flood risk.
Mention of specific public discussion is scant within the plan.
b. Is the administrative authority for preparation indicated (Council or Planning
Commission resolution, state law, federal requirement, etc.)?
Evaluation: The administrative authority is the Coastal Protection and
Restoration Authority.
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c. Is the role of the preparing agency or firm adequately explained (e.g. a letter of
transmittal)?
Evaluation: The plan acknowledges the citizens, legislators, parish
representatives, and stakeholder groups who attended meetings. It
explains how public comments affected final decisions for certain projects
(110-113). To an extent, it does explain the role of the Framework
Development Team; Fisheries, Oil and Gas, and Navigation Focus
Groups; Science and Engineering Board; Technical Advisory Committees;
Predictive Modeling Workgroup; Subsidence Advisory Panel; and Marsh
Collapse Advisory Panel. It does not specifically address how advice
from each panel was implemented for particular projects.
d. Is the background information presented (e.g. reasons for plan presentation)?
Evaluation: The introduction (13-40) provides background information
about the coastal crisis. Here, the problem is defined. Chapter I (41-62)
prefaces the guidelines of the master plan.
e. Is it clear who the plan is for (e.g. citizens, agency head, city council, board)?
Evaluation: The plan explains itself as one created by the CPRA, and to be
passed by the Louisiana Legislature for the benefit of the State, including
its citizens and agencies.
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f. Is the purpose of the plan explained (e.g. study, information, decision, action,
conveyance of advice)?
Evaluation: The purpose is to create a plan of action for the next 50 years.
g. Is the type of plan and its scope reported early on, to alert the reader about what to
expect (e.g. the reader is alerted that this plan is highly quantitative and analytic;
far ranging or narrow; specific, and technical.)?
Evaluation: Within the introduction, readers are told that the legislature
directed the CPRA to “take maximum advantage of new science and
innovation” (24). The plan, however, is not overly technical. Much of the
plan is reported in a quantitative, analytic manner, though most scientific
data is not included in the body of the plan. Much of this information is
located within the appendices, which are contained in individual
documents and must be obtained separately.
h. Is an overview/summary provided (e.g. federal, state, local, private donor,
agency)?
Evaluation: The plan is summarized in the conclusion.
i. Is the amount of time in preparation shown (total person/hrs. weeks, etc.)?
Evaluation: This information can be found within the meeting summaries
within the appendices.
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2) “Rational Model” Considerations (Show basic planning considerations based on
underlying theory and its criteria. Even beyond the list here, there are many theories and
types of plans. The plan authors must be clear themselves about what they are doing to
transmit clarity to the reader.)
a. Given the type of plan to be prepared, are the plan formulators clear about the
criteria they will use to assess its program while being formulated?
Evaluation: The decision criteria is listed on pages 56-57: support of
cultural heritage, distribution of flood risk reduction across socioeconomic
groups, flood protection of historic properties, flood protection of strategic
assets, support of navigation, support of oil and gas, use of natural
processes, operations and maintenance, and sustainability. While the plan
is entitled, “Louisiana’s Comprehensive Master Plan for a Sustainable
Coast,” sustainability is listed last of all other decision criteria. The
explanation reads, “This criterion puts a higher value on restoration
projects that keep building or sustaining land 40 to 50 years after they are
built” (57). It does not mention a balance between environmental,
economic, and social interests. Additionally, the plan does not explain
how decision criteria are prioritized.
b. Have these criteria been explicit in the plan?
Evaluation: Each decision criterion is listed within Chapter I.
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c. Are problems specifically identified (or only implied)?
Evaluation: Problems related to land loss and ecological change are
thoroughly addressed in the introduction (13-39). The plan also
approaches particular economic threats in this section. The plan does not
address cultural or sociological concerns.
d. Are goals and objectives explicitly identified?
Evaluation: The mission statement includes intentions for a
comprehensive scope, broad based collaboration, and providing for future
generations. Overall goals are protection and restoration (30). Master
plan objectives involve flood protection, natural processes, coastal
habitats, cultural heritage, working coast (43). The plan, however, does
not explicitly set forth connections between goals, objectives, and policy
implications. Guidelines for the Master Plan should be connected to
policies discussed at the end of the plan so that readers may understand
how projects and policies will satisfy goals and objectives.
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e. Is the tone of the plan commensurate with the planning approach recommended
(e.g., comprehensive, incremental, advocacy, etc.)?
i. If the plan is intended to be comprehensive, does it relate substantively to
a larger whole (e.g., horizontal relation to other agencies and adjacent
governing bodies)?
Evaluation: The plan is meant to be comprehensive, a word often used
interchangeably with master (plan). In a regional sense, the plan focuses
on Louisiana’s entire coast in terms of land loss and flood protection. The
plan, however, is not comprehensive because it does not comprehensively
address all coastal issues. For example, the plan does not incorporate land
use or development plans of coastal communities, which could have
serious implications for the future of the coast as a whole.
ii. Does the plan consider the regional or next higher level of government or
context (e.g. vertical relation)?
Evaluation: Yes. The plan was produced by a state agency, CPRA, which
received a mandate from the Louisiana Legislature. CPRA mentions the
directives of the State.
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iii. Is there planning for procedural coordination with other plans and
agencies?
Evaluation: The master plan approach is similar to that of the Coastal
Wetlands Planning, Protection, and Restoration Act Program. The Master
Plan supports CWPPRA projects that are in line with its objectives and
principles, and will not cost share projects that are in conflict with the
master plan (167). Additionally, the master plan claims to coordinate with
at least 17 prior studies and plans for the coast (65). It was unable to
incorporate all projects and initiatives of these other plans. Research and
modeling used for the Master Plan was undertaken separately by
participating scientists, and the procedure used in this plan differs from the
others. Coordination among plans appears superficial.
b. Is the capacity or adequacy of existing infrastructure and organizational systems
described?
Evaluation: Yes. This is done by modeling the expected annual damages
from flooding and potential annual land change over the next 50 years,
among other models, for the Future without Action versus the Master Plan
as proposed.
c. Are alternatives listed, or at least considered?
Evaluation: The plan does not list alternatives other than the future
without action. Alternatives or individual projects not selected for the
plan are not discussed.
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d. Are the alternatives identified as “variations on a theme,” or as radically
different?
Evaluation: The plan does not list alternatives. Only selected projects are
listed.
e. Are tradeoffs permitted?
Evaluation: Tradeoffs are not permitted.
3) Procedural Validity (Explain the who and the how of the plan-making; inform the reader
about what went on in making the plan and what is going on by publishing it.)
a. Who was involved in the plan formulation (e.g. staff from different agencies or
departments, citizen groups, politicians)?
Evaluation: Participation in the plan included the Planning Team (33
CPRA employees and consultants), the Science and Engineering Board
(10 members), Technical Advisory Committees (10 members), the
Framework Development Team (33 representatives), the Navigation Focus
Group (18 members), the Oil and Gas Focus Group (8 members), and the
Fisheries Focus Group (15 members), twelve Predictive Modeling
Workgroups (61 members total), the Subsidence Advisory Panel (7
members), and the Marsh Collapse Advisory Panel (6 members). The
plan also claims that 1,350 people attended regional community meetings
and public hearings (48). The plan furthermore lists groups consulted
(49).
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b. How were they chosen (e.g. on the basis of expertise, interest, volunteering, or
other self-selection)?
Evaluation: Committee, board, panel, and focus group members were
chosen based upon professional interest and/or scientific expertise.
c. How were they involved (e.g. discussion groups, internal staff memos or papers,
public meetings)?
Evaluation: The public was invited to ten community meetings between
July and September 2011 and three public hearings held in early January
2012. Committees, boards, advisory panels, and focus groups met
throughout the planning process. These meetings were not open to the
public.
d. How were data, models, goals, and other pertinent information used in
recommending policy or action?
Evaluation: Biophysical data informs models, which are used to
recommend policy and action. Objectives, which involve flood protection,
natural processes, coastal habitats, cultural heritage, and a working coast,
are used to justify the plan.
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e. How were technical matters transformed into recommended policy (e.g., through
ordinary knowledge, experience, scientific training, design training)?
Evaluation: Technical models, built by biophysical scientists, are used to
inform policy. Details from these models are stored in the appendices.
Within the body, data is oversimplified, and the explanation may come
across as condescending: “Underneath the complex graphs and tables is a
simple purpose—to combat the catastrophe engulfing our state and create
a secure future for our citizens. When all is said and done, that is what the
master plan is all about” (38). The message asks for a reader’s trust
because non-experts are not sophisticated enough to understand the
process. Traditional ecological knowledge of local residents is not
utilized.
f. Was an advisory group used?
Evaluation: The Framework Development Team; Fisheries, Oil and Gas,
and Navigation Focus Groups; Science and Engineering Board; Technical
Advisory Committees; Predictive Modeling Workgroup; Subsidence
Advisory Panel; and Marsh Collapse Advisory Panel all held advisory
capacities.
g. Were preliminary drafts circulated for public comment?
Evaluation: The draft was released in January 2012, and was
downloadable online. The CPRA then held three public meetings in New
Orleans (January 23), Houma (January 24), and Lake Charles (January
25). Public comments were accepted through February 25, 2012.
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4) Adequacy of Scope (Show how the plan is connected to the larger world.)
a) Have all possible or pertinent issues been considered (e.g., physical, social,
economic, political, psychological, cultural, or design)?
Evaluation: The plan claims to have considered all pertinent issues, but it
does not actually consider pertinent social and cultural issues. Of all
advisory groups, only three social scientists participated on the Cultural
Heritage Technical Advisory Committee. The plan does not consider
unique issues faced by Native American Tribes or other local populations.
b) Have issues of efficacy and equity and predictability been considered?
Evaluation: Issues of social equity are not considered, though they seem to
be implied. The planning approach is predominantly
environmental/biophysical and marginally economic. Social science is
severely lacking within this plan.
c) Has the distribution of costs and benefits among different groups and interests
been considered?
Evaluation: Costs and benefits are significant driving forces within the
plan. Project descriptions and costs for first and second implementation
periods are listed by region within Chapter V (115-163).
d) Have relocation/displacement implications been considered?
Evaluation: Relocation/displacement implications are not addressed.
Concerns were raised in public hearing and submitted public comments,
but the finalized plan does not mention any changes made on behalf of
these concerns.
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e) Have the legal implications been considered?
Evaluation: Policy and legal aspects are discussed near the end of the
document (173-176). Topics covered include the Gulf Coast Ecosystem
Restoration Task Force, the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, mitigation
policy, Congressional and legislative actions, sound management of
limited resources in the coastal zone, and the Freshwater Management
Plan.
f) Has feasibility in the larger political context been considered?
Evaluation: Neither local and regional politics, nor their implications are
discussed in depth within the master plan.
5) Guidance for Implementation (Most plans are intended to do something. Consider the
instruments [ordinances, regulations, budgets, schedules, etc.] and the agencies and
persons responsible for making the plan work. Should they be included? [A vision plan
would not have an implementation aspect; rather, it would have a section dealing with
“the next steps.”])
a. Are implementation provisions appropriate in the plan?
Evaluation: Yes. The plan prioritizes plans for implementation by phase
and region. Implementation is dependent upon funding.
b. Are there priorities for implementation?
Evaluation: Yes. Projects are organized by implementation period. Cost
plays a role in prioritization. The plan claims that a new aspect of the
2012 Master Plan is the “use of innovative tools to identify the best
projects and the most effective use of dollars” (42).
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c. Is cost of implementation vs. nonimplementation considered?
Evaluation: Cost of implementation is listed by project in the tables of
Chapter V. Cost of nonimplementation is considered within the plan in
the “future without action” scenario. For example, in a moderate scenario,
the plan estimates a $5.3 billion decrease in expected annual damages
from flooding at year 50 if the master plan is implemented. It estimates an
$18 billion decrease in a less optimistic scenario (28).
d. Is there a time span for plan implementation?
Evaluation: The master plan looks 50 years into the future and will be
updated every 5 years.
e. Is there provision for scheduling and coordinating of implementation proposals?
Evaluation: Each project is separated into the first implementation period
(2012-2031) to the second implementation period (2032-2061). Not every
project is guaranteed to be approved for the second implementation
period.
f. Can proposals accomplish their intended purpose if implemented?
Evaluation: Models show that projects are likely to succeed as flood
control and land building mechanisms if implemented properly. The
likelihood to achieve economic and social objectives is unknown.
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g. Is there a program or proposal for an impact analysis?
Evaluation: Included are evaluations of environmental factors including
sea level rise, subsidence, storm frequency, river discharge/sediment load,
river nutrient concentration, rainfall, evapotranspiration, and marsh
collapse threshold.
h. Is the agency or person responsible for implementation identified?
Evaluation: Yes. The CPRA is responsible for implementation, though
particular contractors are not listed in the body of the main document.
i. Can the responsible agency realistically be expected to implement the plan?
Evaluation: Yes. CPRA created its first master plan in 2007 and continues
to implement projects.
6) Approach, Data, and Methodology (Make clear the technical bases, if any, of the plan;
where the data come from and how they are used, so that others may check the plan’s
thinking by use of the same sources.)
a. Is the plan based on a wide spectrum of data where feasible?
Evaluation: The plan is based upon a wide spectrum of biophysical data,
but is limited in its capacity to deal with economic and social data as a
result of its focus and priorities.
b. Is the plan sufficiently flexible to permit new data and findings to be fed in?
Evaluation: The plan incorporated adaptive management principles, which
allows for adjustments in the face of change. The plan is updated every 5
years, so new data may have an effect on future decisions.
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c. Are the data sources cited?
Evaluation: Data sources are often not cited properly. Rationale is not
credited to particular boards. Photographs were used without permission
or photo credit. Photographs of local minority groups were often used,
giving the appearance of a high level of citizen collaboration, though these
groups tend to feel otherwise.
d. Are the methodology sources cited?
Evaluation: Methods are somewhat explained, though the roles of
particular advisory groups are unclear.
e. Are the levels of data aggregation relevant or meaningful to the study?
Evaluation: Levels of data aggregation appear to be very meaningful to the
study.
7) Quality of Communication (Clear communication above all else is necessary for fair
hearing from others.)
a. Is the client or reading public identified (e.g., public at large, other professionals)?
Evaluation: The body of the master plan is directed toward the public,
which is made clear early in the document.
b. Are the ideas convincingly presented, given the nature of the audience?
Evaluation: The ideas are convincingly presented, though the general
public has little opportunity to check its validity given the scientific
approach. Local and traditional ecological knowledge is not considered,
so much of the local expertise is excluded.
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c. Are the rationales behind the decisions effectively presented?
Evaluation: The rationales for individual projects are based upon science.
Any other rationale playing a role in particular projects is not included in
the text. As a whole, the master plan describes its rationale within
decision criteria.
d. Are the proposals/recommendations/conclusions consistent with objectives?
Evaluation: For the most part, project proposals are consistent with
objectives; however, the objective to sustain the unique cultural heritage is
vague and its connection to individual projects is undefined.
e. Is the tone of the document consistent with the message conveyed (e.g., not
presented in the past tense as an accomplished fact when the plan is for study and
review)?
Evaluation: Yes. The plan is targeted for the next 50 years and is
conveyed as such.
f. Are the criteria indicated by which the plan is intended to be judged?
Evaluation: The decision criteria are used to justify the plan, but the
decision drivers seem to be more apt as tools to judge the plan. Two
questions represent the plan’s decision drivers: 1) How well did the
projects reduce flood risk; 2) How well did the projects build new land or
sustain the land we already have? If these two questions are answered in
the affirmative after project implementation, the CPRA most likely will
consider a project successful.
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8) Plan Format (Other forms of communication are found in the plan format itself, as well as
evidence on who takes professional responsibility for the plan’s formulation, when it was
adopted, and other seemingly incidental concerns that nevertheless communicate
professional competence.)
a. Are the size and format conducive to the use intended? (For example, an oversize
plan is hard to file and copy, hence does not lend itself to constant reference and
day-to-day use.)
Evaluation: The plan is formatted to be used as a standard document,
which can be printed by an average citizen.
b. Is the date of publication shown?
Evaluation: The publication date is not on the cover or title page. The
body of the text states that the plan was submitted in 2012.
c. Are the authors shown, to indicate professional responsibility (names of personnel
who worked on the plan, as well as agency or firm names)?
Evaluation: Yes. CRPA members are listed first, followed by the
acknowledgment of advisory groups.
d. Is there a table of contents?
Evaluation: Yes.
e. Are pages numbered?
Evaluation: Yes.
f. Are graphics used to best advantage?
Evaluation: Graphics are well-utilized, though credit is not listed below. In
some cases, photos of citizens are used without permission.
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g. Is the plan attractively laid out?
Evaluation: Yes. The layout is attractive and easy to read.
Evaluation Criteria
(1) Adequacy of
Context

Strength overall

(2) "Rational Model"
Considerations

Weakness overall

(3) Procedural
Validity

Question
a.

Strength

Neutral

Weakness

•
•

b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

a.

•

b.
c.
d.
e.i.
e.ii.
e.iii.
f.
g.
h.
i.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

a.

•

b.
•
c.
•
d.
Neutral overall
•
e.
•
f.
•
g.
•
Table 2. Results matrix of Louisiana’s 2012 coastal master plan (adapted from
Baer 2007).
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Evaluation Criteria
(4) Adequacy of
Scope
Weakness overall

(5) Guidence for
Implementation

Strength overall

(6) Approach, Data,
and Methodology
Neutral overall

(7) Quality of
Communication

Strength overall

(8) Plan Format

Strength overall

Question

Strength

Neutral

a.

Weakness
•
•

b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

•
•
•
•

a.

•
•
•
•

b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

•
•
•
•
•

a.

•

b.
c.
d.
e.

•
•
•
•

a.

•

b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Table 2 continued
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Overall Assessment of Results
After reviewing Baer’s criteria in Figure 1, followed by Louisiana’s Coastal Master Plan
results in Table 2, note that questions oriented toward social equity and public participation are
embedded within particular standards as opposed to others. For instance, (2) “Rational Model”
Considerations, (3) Procedural Validity, and (4) Adequacy of Scope are backed by questions
about considerations for the reader, involvement in the planning process, and how the plan is
connected to the larger world. Other criteria are more procedural or perfunctory. For example,
(1) Adequacy of Context evaluates whether the document provides a proper background for the
plan being created; while, (8) Plan Format assesses the layout and readability of the document
itself. Each criterion is vital in its own right, to achieve at least a marginally successful master
plan.
In Table 2, the evaluation results for Louisiana’s 2012 Coastal Master Plan are listed as
strengths, weaknesses, or neutral assessments depending upon the written evaluation of each
question. Most evaluation criteria suggested overall strengths. These include (1) Adequacy of
Context, (5) Guidance for Implementation, (7) Quality of Communication, and (8) Plan Format.
Two were largely neutral: (3) Procedural Validity and (6) Approach, Data, and Methodology.
Two criteria suggested overall plan weaknesses: (2) “Rational Model” Considerations and (4)
Adequacy of Scope. One neutral criterion (procedural validity) and both criteria listed as
weaknesses (“rational model” considerations and adequacy of scope) contain social equity
concerns.
Baer’s evaluation criteria assures for the representation of professional planning
standards, while also guarding against omissions. This assessment is the first cut at the
integration of planning theory for comprehensive, sustainable plans. The plan critique, under
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these standards, reflects a weakness in social engagement within the planning process. From this
assessment, the analysis will delve into further detail on the need for a more active level of
citizen power. Furthermore, this evaluation will proceed by defining sustainability and
evaluating perceptions of public participation.
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Chapter VI

Analysis of Adaptive Co-Management: Sustainability
Perhaps the most currently pervasive conceptualization of sustainability can be traced
back to the World Commission on Environment and Development, also known as the Brundtland
Commission. Holistically thinking, development is sustainable if it “meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED
1987). Other definitions, while also holistic, are more concerned with integrating human and
environmental considerations: “[The] sustainable society is one that lives within the selfperpetuating limits of its environment” (Coomer 1979; cited in Faber et al. 2005:3).
Redefining Sustainability: Campbell’s “Planner’s Triangle
For planning professionals, sustainability became more broadly defined in 1996.
University of Michigan Professor Scott Campbell published the article, “Green Cities, Growing
Cities, Just Cities?: Urban Planning and the Contradictions of Sustainable Development” in the
Journal of the American Planning Association. In his article, Campbell explores the need for
consideration of the interplay between environmental protection, economic development, and
social equity concerns:
Nothing inherent in the discipline steers planners either toward environmental
protection or toward economic development—or toward a third goal of planning:
social equity. Instead, planners work within the tension generated among these
three fundamental aims, which, collectively, I call the “planner’s triangle,” with
sustainable development located at its center. This center cannot be reached
directly, but only approximately and indirectly, through a sustained period of
confronting and resolving the triangle’s conflicts. (Campbell 1996:296)
Campbell further identifies three conflicts, as presented in Figure 2, located along the
axes of the planner’s triangle: the property conflict, the resource conflict, and the development
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conflict. The property conflict is settled between economic growth and equity. It “arises from
competing claims on and uses of property, such as between management and labor, landlords and
tenants, or gentrifying professionals and long-time residents” (298). This growth-equity conflict
is further complicated because each side not only resists the other, but also needs the other for its
own survival. The resource conflict comes between economic development and environmental
protection. “Business resists the regulation of its exploitation of nature, but at the same time
needs regulation to conserve those resources for present and future demands” (299). The
development conflict is a challenge between social equity and environmental preservation.
Campbell elucidates further:
If the property conflict is characterized by the economy's ambivalent interest in
providing at least a subsistence existence for working people, and the resource
conflict by the economy's ambivalent interest in providing sustainable conditions
for the natural environment, the development conflict stems from the difficulty of
doing both at once.” This may be the most confounding and challenging
conundrum of all. (299)
In coastal Louisiana, the property conflict is a tension between the needs of people to live
and work on land within a hazard-prone locale; whereas, the resource conflict can be
conceptualized by the clash between local and corporate industries, including oil, gas,
navigation, and fisheries, and wellbeing of social-ecological systems. The development conflict,
therefore, is the complexity in ensuring environmental justice for the people of the coast, while
sustaining necessary economic interests.
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Figure 2. Campbell’s “Planner’s Triangle” (Campbell 1996)
The Sustainability of Adaptive Co-Management
From the adaptive governance literature, one can easily spot the inherent resemblance
between adaptive co-management principles and pervasive sustainability definitions. The
management of social-ecological systems, as expressed by Berkes and Folke (2002), expresses
an integration of human and natural systems under adaptive co-management theory. This
sentiment is thoroughly contemplated by Campbell’s integration of human systems elements
(society and economics), natural systems (the environment), and the conflicts that lie within its
integration. The argument can then be made that adaptive co-management, when executed
properly, achieves sustainability.
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The two concepts tend to be used in tandem within governance studies. For example, the
quantitative survey evaluation by Schultz, Duit, and Folke (2011), which assessed the
performance of Biosphere Reserves (linked to adaptive co-management principles), found a
supporting relationship within its overall results:
Effectiveness in sustainable development goals was associated to participation by
local inhabitants. Adaptive co-management practices were associated with a
higher level of effectiveness in achieving development goals, and this higher
effectiveness did not seem to be at the expense of biodiversity conservation.
(Schultz, Duit, & Folke 2011:662)
Furthermore, the essential features of adaptive co-management include both sustainable
development efforts and an integrated approach to development. In full, these include (1)
involvement of both local inhabitants/communities and governments in decision-making (a
defining condition for co-management), (2) conservation and sustainable development efforts
pursued in concert (social-ecological systems approach), (3) dialog, collaboration, and
integration of different objectives, (4) monitoring and responding to ecosystem feedback
performed combining different knowledge systems, including science, and (5) a shared vision
has developed (Schultz, Duit, & Folke 2011:666). Adaptive co-management, therefore, is a
sustainable practice. Sustainability is achieved through a social-ecological balance and leads to
higher perceived effectiveness in achieving development goals at no cost to conservation.
Sustainability through a social-ecological balance, therefore, is more effective than conventional
methods of natural resource planning.
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Balanced is Better
Why should Louisiana’s Coastal Master Plan not be biased toward environmental
protection? It is, after all, an environmental plan. In countless regions, plans have been
separated by purpose. Economic development plans are biased toward economic prosperity,
social policy plans are biased toward social equity, and environmental plans are biased toward
ecological health. Nevertheless, a piecemeal focus will result in piecemeal results.
If sustainable development goals can be achieved, as perceived in the Biosphere Reserves
(Schultz, Duit, & Folke 2011), while local inhabitants participate in the planning process without
reducing the effectiveness of key conservation goals, more citizen have buy-in and goals are still
achieved. Essentially planners will be spending less time in negotiation and conflict resolution at
the end of the process. Discussion and negotiation should occur throughout the participatory
process instead.
Furthermore, the argument that Lousiana’s Coastal Master Plan is not sustainable is
beyond a debate in semantics. It is more than an error in terminology. The integration of social
and ecological dimensions is one of the most vital and challenging aspects of planning. Simply
acknowledging that the challenge exists is only the beginning. Scott Campbell argues that the
three axial conflicts of the planner’s triangle, between economic growth, environmental
protection, and social justice, are mutually dependent based not only on opposition, but in
collaboration (Campbell 1996:300). If planners ignore this dependence by ignoring particular
conflicts as opposed to others, the result will be a disingenuous, unsustainable plan. Of course,
achieving sustainability should not be considered a utopian result free of conflict and full of
societal acceptance. The true achievement of sustainability continues to be elusive.
Conceptualization and sustainable practice is an iterative and evolutionary process.
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Louisiana’s Coastal Master Plan: Claims of Sustainability
Louisiana’s Coastal Master Plan labels sustainability as a decision criterion, which
allowed the team to “consider different ways that risk reduction and restoration projects could
affect the coast.” The CPRA pithily defines the function of sustainability last of all criteria:
“This criterion places a higher value on restoration projects that keep building or sustaining land
40 to 50 years after they are built” (CPRA 2012a:57). The body of the text within the plan
directs readers to Appendix B, promising more details about the decision criteria. As a principle
to serve as a guideline for fulfilling the master plan’s mission and objectives, “seeking
sustainability” is narrowly described:
The master plan seeks the long term sustainability of the coast while recognizing
the urgent need for action. A sustainable system is one characterized by
consistent levels of productivity and resilience (i.e., the ability to withstand
naturally variable conditions and/or recover from disturbances). Creating a
sustainable system will reduce the long term costs of projects, both in terms of
energy use and operation and maintenance expenses. The master plan relies, to
the maximum extent possible, on natural cycles and processes. This will be done
while keeping limited funding and resource budgets in mind (CPRA 2012b:B-8).
By conducting a content analysis on the passage above, we can break down the function of each
sentence. First is an introductory objective, followed by a definition of a sustainable system in
the second sentence. The third sentence is a hypothesis for the effects of such a system. The
fourth and fifth sentences do not expound upon sustainability, but provide support for the master
plan itself.
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Sustainability and Economic Growth
Introducing budget concerns into a principle labeled “seeking sustainability” presents
confusion. Sustainability under these terms seems to more closely relate to productive efficiency
(i.e., reducing long term costs of projects) than stewardship of the environment. In reality, cost
effectiveness and budgeting considerations for restoration projects, though related to the
planning process itself, are unrelated to the overall sustainability of the plan and its subsequent
results for the coast. The third and fifth sentences relating to costs and funding should be
relocated to describe budgeting principles, not social-ecological sustainability principles. One
may then ask, why are project funding concerns irrelevant to sustainability, when economics is a
primary pillar of sustainability? While economics is a primary consideration of sustainability,
the consideration lies within sustaining the economic wellbeing of the region, and should not be
specific to CPRA’s pocketbook. To clarify further, sustainability considers the economic effects
of vital industries along the coast, not the plan budget.
For further consideration, CPRA’s definition of sustainability can be isolated: “A
sustainable system is one characterized by consistent levels of productivity and resilience (i.e.,
the ability to withstand naturally variable conditions and/or recover from disturbances).”
Productivity is left undefined. Perhaps it implies the production of benefits to reduce risk, which
could include potential failure of levees and floodwalls; risk to economic trends and
demographics; or flood frequency (CPRA 2012a:92). Perhaps productivity alludes to the
prospect of land gain, which is estimated to begin within the time period of 2042-2051 through
the implementation of the master plan. Either way, the definition, as written, is ambiguous and
constrained.
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Sustainability and Environmental Protection
The appendix then succinctly describes “sustainability of land” as a decision criterion:
This decision criterion seeks to reflect the sustainability of land created by
restoration projects. Sustainability is approximated by a simple measure of
persistence of land: the degree to which land that is built 40 years after
construction is present 10 years later (50 years after construction). Specifically,
this decision criterion is equal to the changes in land between the 50th and 40th
year after construction is completed. Scores greater than or equal to zero indicate
that land is persisting after 50 years (CPRA 2012a:B-19).
As mentioned previously, sustainability takes on a narrow definition specific to
biophysical systems. The passage above describes a methodology used to create indices which
measures land change from 40 to 50 years after project implementation. None of the decision
criteria account for overall sustainability. The elements which could approach sustainability are
presented in a piecemeal fashion as decision criterion. In full, these include distribution of flood
risk across socioeconomic groups; use of natural processes; sustainability of land, operation and
maintenance costs at year 50; support of cultural heritage; flood protection of historic properties;
support of navigation; flood protection of strategic assets; and support of oil and gas (CPRA
2012b:B-17-24).
Sustainability and Social Justice: Assessing the Balance
Furthermore, the disparity between economic development, environmental protection,
and social equity concerns (i.e., Campbell’s sustainable planner’s triangle) is apparent within
Appendix B. References to master plan objectives appear after each listed decision criterion. In
other words, each decision criterion fulfils one of the objectives listed on pages 56-57 of the
plan’s main body. These include (1) flood protection, (2) natural processes, (3) coastal habitats,
(4) cultural heritage, and (5) working coast. The first three objectives (flood protection, natural
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processes, and coastal habitats) are environmental in that they deal with environmental risk. The
fourth objective (cultural heritage) is social, and the fifth (working coast) is economic.
The appendix also lists decision criteria. These include long term progress toward risk
reduction, near term progress towards risk reduction, long term progress towards creating land,
near term progress towards creating land, distribution of flood risks across socioeconomic
groups, use of natural processes, sustainability of land, operations and maintenance costs at year
50, support of cultural heritage, flood protection of historic properties, support of navigation,
flood protection of strategic assets, support of oil and gas, progress towards risk reduction
metrics, progress towards ecosystem services metrics, and critical landforms.
Six of the decision drivers/decision criteria support objective one (1); three decision
criteria support objective two (2); one addition metric supports objective three (3); two decision
criteria support objective four (4); three decision criteria support objective five (5); and one
additional metric contains no reference. This means, a total of ten decision drivers, criteria, and
metrics support environmental objectives; whereas, two decision criteria support a social
objective, and three decision criteria support an economic objective. This is a 67 percent
environmental, 13 percent social, and 20 percent economic split. One could potentially argue
that distribution of flood risk across socioeconomic groups could also be a social equity concern
and not only an environmental one. In this case, the distribution could be 60 percent
environmental, 20 percent social, and 20 percent economic. Either way, the decision criteria are
clearly biased toward environmental objectives, presenting us with the issue of an unbalanced,
unsustainable planner’s triangle.
By leaving out considerations for economic development and social equity within its
sustainability definitions, and without addressing those tensions which lie between primary
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considerations, the CPRA misses an opportunity to broadly conceptualize the social-ecological
issues of the coastal region. Therefore, the plan fails, first, to be truly comprehensive and
second, to be sustainable in a broad sense.
Analysis of Adaptive Co-Management: Participation
Following Arnstein’s “ladder of citizen participation,” the level of citizens’ power as
executed in Louisiana’s 2012 Coastal Master Plan, would hover around consultation or placation.
In her article, Arnstein creates an eight-rung typology of citizen power: manipulation, therapy,
informing, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power, and citizen control. The ladder
is fully represented in Figure 4. Under manipulation, she refers to people placed on “rubber
stamp advisory committees or advisory boards for the express purpose of ‘educating’ them or
engineering their support” (Arnstein 1969:218). This typology exemplifies citizen advisory
groups without real power, who were actually advised by officials and not the reverse. Arnstein
then considers the next rung, therapy, to be invidious, dishonest, and arrogant, where “citizens
are engaged in extensive activity, but the focus of it is in curing them of their “pathology” rather
than changing the racism and victimization that create their ‘pathologies’” (218). Next up is
informing, where one-way communication occurs in public meetings. Consultation is said to be
a legitimate step toward full participation. Nevertheless, Arnstein notes the restriction of
citizens’ ideas at this level—a “window-dressing” ritual—where citizens have “participated in
participation.” According to Arnstein, “People are primarily perceived as statistical abstractions,
and participation is measured by how many have come to meetings, take brochures home, or
answer a questionnaire” (219). Tokenism is still perceptible under placation strategies. This is
the level at which Louisiana’s Coastal Master Plan operated:
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An example of placation strategy is to place a few hand-picked “worthy” poor on
boards of Community Action Agencies or on public bodies like the board of
education, or police commission, or housing authority. If they are not
accountable to a constituency in the community and if the traditional power elite
hold the majority of seats, the have-nots can be easily outvoted or outfoxed.
(Arnstein 1969:220)

Figure 3. Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation (Arnstein 1969)
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At a higher rung is partnership. Under this regime, citizens and power-holders share
planning and decision-making responsibilities (i.e., through joint policy boards, planning
committees). At the highest levels of citizen power are delegated power and citizen control,
where citizens achieve dominant authority in planning through negotiations, or where residents
are in full charge of policy, management, and negotiation respectively (221-223). Each level, or
rung, is then grouped further. Manipulation and therapy are forms of nonparticipation.
Informing, consultation, and placation are forms of tokenism. Finally, partnership, delegated
power, and citizen control are forms of citizen power. The need to move from a tokenism regime
to one of citizen power in Louisiana’s Coastal Master Plan is begged by citizens in a variety of
ways.
The evidence of tokenism lies within the public comments, logged in Appendix G of the
plan (CPRA 2012b). Appendices are all publicly accessible online. These public comments are
labeled, “Unique.” Unlike form letters, these comments were written and submitted by
individuals or groups with distinctive concerns. Citizens were able to discuss considerations at
length without limitations. Public comments were submitted after the release of the Draft Master
Plan on January 12, 2012 and before the deadline of February 25, 2012.
The planning approach to the Coastal Master Plan is not unusual, in that many planning
processes utilize public hearings and public comment submittal periods. In the case of an
ambitious State regional plan claiming comprehensiveness and sustainability, however, the
expectations for citizen engagement are higher, and the need for community buy-in is much
more crucial. To examine the earnestness of the Coastal Master Plan, one must first take a
peremptory glance at the care taken toward submitted public comments. At the time of this
publication, Appendix G-5, containing the plan’s unique comments, reproduces several pages of
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commentary upside-down in its downloadable format. Additionally, the comments are not in
any chronological or thematic order, and many of the submittals are duplicated in various places.
The level of thoughtfulness taken toward these public comments is dubious.
Inaccessibility
Numerous citizens felt that meetings were inadequate or inaccessible, while others felt
that materials were not properly distributed for the public to give fair input:
I respectfully request that another round of meetings, be held across the state.
The citizens of Monroe, Vidalia, etc. need to know what saving the coast means
to them, and they need to become motivated enough to ask their representatives
to strongly support the concept.
(Frank J. Beninate III, President of Wetlands Services, Inc.)
Although a massive undertaking, the discussion and formation of the Master Plan
should start sooner in order to give the public and affected people more time to
study and participate in commenting and selection of projects. Much of the
technical information that went into building the Master Plan is still not available
to the general public. This was evident at several of the public comment
meetings when listening to coastal elected officials and residents who had huge
disagreements in the selection of projects in their areas.
(Louisiana Shrimp Association)
All the residents see is false hope and untrue statements to gain votes. Why not
have open meetings in the lower end of Plaquemines Parish to address the areas
where the real problems are happening now, but instead you make meetings
difficult to make by having them 50-60 miles away. Just another reason people
don’t trust politicians.
(Edward Derouen, Jr.)
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While this public comment period is important and we appreciate the opportunity
to submit comments, BISCO has noted that this draft does not include in its
booklet format (the most readily accessible format for the population with whom
we work) any of the appendices where we have been told there are more details
available. If the public can’t see the appendices, do they really exist or have an
impact? And how can the public comment if they can’t see the appendices?
(Bayou Interfaith Shared Community Organizing (BISCO))
Although they were requested numerous times, prior to the release of the Draft
2012 Coastal Master Plan, hard copies of clear, easy to understand, detailed
project descriptions, summaries and maps for each of the projects were never
provided to citizen representatives or the public…Gaining a clear
understanding of a project and its potential impacts on them and their
communities from a paragraph made up of a couple of sentences and trying to
find that project on a large map can be overwhelming, making it extremely
difficult to make educational comments at a public meeting. This may lead
people to support a project that they would not otherwise support or oppose one
they may have supported.
(Tracy Kuhns, Executive Director of Louisiana Bayoukeeper, Inc. and
Michael Roberts, President of the Association of Family Fishermen)

Involvement of Minorities
Upon more thorough examination, the aforementioned lack of social equity consideration
is a serious shortfall to many, as supported by the multitude of comments from Louisiana
citizens. The plan failed to utilize traditional knowledge of residents. In numerous instances,
citizens felt that minorities were excluded from the planning process and do not receive the
benefits of the protection given to others:
According to the 2010 Census, over 1/3 of the individuals residing in areas where
coastal restoration projects will occur are made up of minorities. We believe that
it is essential that such minorities be an integral part in the development of the
Master Plan.
(Lovera Shaula, Catholic Charities Archdiocese of New Orleans)
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In addition to the CPRA, there are approximately 175 people that were cited as
part of the various teams, groups, panels, etc. that provided some input into the
plan. However, I am concerned that many of these highly educated people might
have a lot of good information but don’t really understand or appreciate the
intricacies of the area as well as the people that have lived in the coastal area
for generations. Most of these locals understand the land and the resources
perhaps better than the more educated folks that are cited in the plan. More of
their input should have been sought and used in the preparation of the plan.
(Citizen of Vacherie, LA)
Our coastal heritage is more than nostalgia. Our coastal communities are
repositories of contextual coastal knowledge that can improve coastal projects.
Coastal communities have traditional knowledgebases that can be integrated
with more formal scientific efforts, to allow the state to rapidly determine whether
our efforts at restoring are succeeding. The SMP [State Master Plan] should work
more closely with parish planning committees to ensure that local knowledge of
an area is included in project planning, and that local communities are updated
on the progress of projects.
(Gulf Restoration Network)
…However, I am disappointed that the protection of cultural heritage and
equity among socioeconomic groups, at least as they have been operationalized
in the plan, did little to nothing to shift the restoration and protection projects to
do more for communities in South Terrebonne, Lafourche, and Plaquemines
where unique ethnic communities that literally exist nowhere else on earth are
exceptionally vulnerable and receive precious little additional protection.
(Brian Marks, PhD, University of Arizona, Bureau of Applied Research
and Anthropology)
The lack of restoration and protection for communities with high percentage
numbers of indigenous people (and no planning protecting the tribal identities or
cultural isolation rights of those people in the event of forced relocation) appears
as a classic “environmental justice” misstep by the MP and the State. This
should be addressed rapidly and strongly. And Acadian populations also make up
these rural areas allowed to degenerate. It’s like the 1755 Acadian Expulsion or
the “Trail of Tears” all over again!
(Patty Whitney)
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Community Representation
Many comments referred to the total lack of local community representation on the
Framework Development Team, focus groups, or other planning entities. The value of coastal
communities is also underrated by the CPRA according to the public:
To date, there is not one coastal community representative (people who live
and work there) and no representative from any State Recognized Native
American Tribe, no representation from Asian/American communities and no
representation from low income, multi-cultural fishing families. There are,
however, 3 National Environmental Non-Governmental Agencies (ENGO) and 2
Louisiana ENGO’s who claim to represent the interests of Louisiana’s coastal
communities, three oil and gas representatives, 3 representatives of the
transportation industry and representation from all relative state and federal
agencies. Without a seat at the table, it is difficult, if not impossible, for
disadvantaged citizens to have their voice[s] heard.
(Tracy Kuhns, Executive Director of Louisiana Bayoukeeper, Inc; Michael
Roberts, President of the Association of Family Fishermen)
The SMP lacks a “Community” focus group, separate from the parishes, for
those communities at greatest risk from the coastal crisis. Proactive, ongoing
communication with the people who will be evacuating, organized according to
how many groups actually prepare, evacuate, and rebuild, will serve the
implementation, communication, and evaluation of projects.
(Gulf Restoration Network)
The landowner community must continually be involved in the Master Plan
process and kept abreast of any proposed changes being considered, particularly
in regard to laws and regulations including mitigation requirements. It cannot be
stressed enough that communication early and often will be key to the success
of the Plan.
(Louisiana Landowners Association, Inc.)
Overall the plan is a good start but falls short in that it appears that local agencies
were not fully engaged, especially in the beginning of the process. There is a lot
of knowledge at the local [level] that the plan could benefit from. Local folks
know and understand the good, the bad, and the ugly about their respective areas.
(Citizen of Vacherie, LA)
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Landowner input and involvement is crucial. With the majority of the coast held
in private ownership, it baffles me why more credence seems to be given to folks
who neither live, work or pay taxes in the area of proposed protection.
(Timothy J. Allen, General Manager of Apache Louisiana Minerals, LLC.)

Unbalanced Sustainability
In addition to their lack of representation on decision-making boards, citizens felt that
equity of community, commerce, and environment, as advocated by previous reports was not
translated into the Coastal Master Plan. For example, they note the Executive Order to establish
the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task Force (GCERTF) (Executive Order No. 13554 2010)
under the U.S. EPA and the resultant Secretary Mabus Report (Mabus 2010). Note the likeness
of these equitable considerations to those prescribed above by Campbell in his “planner’s
triangle.” Citizens also felt that public meetings were inadequate, and the cultural heritage
information was written by academics, far removed from the communities themselves:
Communities were relegated to the insignificant and inadequate “public
comment” phase of interaction on the drafting of the plan. The end result is that
projects were selected that reflect an incomplete and negatively weighted result
for communities and the people that reside there. This is of course in complete
contra-indication of both the Mabus Report and GCERTF Report, which both
emphasized the necessity for including three sectors equally in plans for
restoration and protection: community, commerce, and environment.
(Bayou Interfaith Shared Community Organizing (BISCO))
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This plan does not seem to adequately address the mandates presented in both the
Mabus Report and the Report of the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Task Force that
restoration recovery should be a three-pronged strategy: addressing an
equitable balance of commerce, environment and community. Once again,
community is addressed as an afterthought. The Framework Development Team
did not include community organizations. The culture and heritage members of
the team are academics from the ivory towers of universities, and while they are
all outstanding in their educational fields, none are working on a day-to-day basis
within the streets of the communities.
(Patty Whitney)
Social Vulnerability
Numerous agencies that operate within the Barataria and Terrebonne Basins collaborated
in order to bring attention to matters of social vulnerability. Again, the theme of community,
environmental, and economic equity arises. Beyond scientific analysis, human factors must be
addressed. Specifically, they seek a social vulnerability analysis to weigh the pros and cons of
each option, which will factor in to the decision-making for project prioritization. They ask for
consideration toward local economic welfare through the support of local job creation during
project implementation. Again, like many of the other groups, they ask for community inclusion,
especially for vulnerable populations, in the decision-making process as granted to other
planning entities:
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An effective Gulf Coast recovery plan must equally value communities,
environment and economic welfare to promote a more resilient coast. With the
increasing vulnerability of the communities within the Barataria and Terrebonne
Basins, we support a plan that undertakes projects not only for their scientifically
determined value, but which also provide the greatest positive impacts and
reduce the risks for economically and socially vulnerable coastal
populations…Finally, future planning processes should further engage local
NGOs, landowners, and community groups as an integral part of the
Framework Development Team and other key planning groups, including the
development of guidelines for responsible and inclusive decision-making
processes, sensitive to the challenges of vulnerable populations.
(Joint effort by agencies within the Barataria and Terrebonne Basins)
There must be a human component to a successful restoration effort. A
restoration plan that has any reasonable chance of being implemented is not one
that can be merely engineered or one that is driven only by science. Success
depends on more than engineering and science. It is imperative to the success
of this restoration effort that our communities and our culture be considered.
BTNEP certainly agrees that a restoration project must adhere to established
engineering and scientific principles, but it must also be acceptable to the
majority of stakeholders. Conflicts are inevitable as we move forward, but these
conflicts must be diminished if our restoration effort has the benefit of community
consensus and support. This is only possible by active engagement and
involvement of the public and the agencies and groups that represent them.
(Kerry M. St. Pé, Program Director of the Barataria-Terrebonne National
Estuary Program)
Refine computer modeling for risk to place more ‘worth’ on community and
residential damages rather than oil & gas strategic assets (at a time when major
oil companies are reaping major profits it should not be the people of Louisiana
who pay to protect their oil rigs, pipeline, refineries, or oil/gas storage facilities)
when 40-60% of Louisiana’s coastal land loss is directly tied to the exploration &
operations of the oil & gas industry. (Example levee structure on west side of
Calcasieu River near Interstate 10 mainly protects Petro Chemical Plants)
(Darryl Malek-Wiley, Sierra Club)
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Misunderstanding of Native Populations
In the name of science, CPRA neglects the needs of America’s oldest members. Citizens
find that indigenous tribes, holders of invaluable traditional ecological knowledge, are
misunderstood and left unprotected by the plan. More consideration was given to the oil and gas
industry than to the protection of traditional communities.
What I heard in the public meeting did not seem like an all inclusive plan, more
so it seemed like a plan to protect the highest tax base areas…I am a member of
the Isle de Jean Charles Band of Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw. Our burial
grounds are in jeopardy as are the lands that our people have inhabited for
generations. Our herbs for healing have already disappeared as well as our trees.
Our way of life, fishing, shrimping and harvesting oysters has been neglected for
what it adds to the state and our way of life. Once, we were a self supporting
tribe who got what they needed from Mother Earth, now we shop in the stores
and buy seafood from places other than our waters. Our land was once 5 miles
wide and now it is lucky if it is ½ a mile. We are part of the protection for Houma
and other coastal communities but yet we are unimportant. Indian artifacts are
being returned across the country to their respective tribe but at the same time our
artifacts are left to wash away…Let the oil and gas industry pay for dredging
and restoration of our lands off the many profits they have received from our
state, our people. Let us not say that a group of people is unimportant and
deserve to be stripped of everything. Let us not pretend that we are God and
doom a coastal area based off the tax dollars it provides the state of Louisiana.
Let us not continue the discrimination that has been rampant for generations
against the Native American peoples and classes which one deems equally
unimportant. I was born and raised and choose to die in the State of Louisiana. I
love my home, don’t you?
(Kelly Bagwell, Member of the Isle de Jean Charles Band of BiloxiChitimacha-Choctaw)
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Cultural Vulnerability and Tokenism
Furthermore, the following submission represents a classic example of tokenism by the
CPRA. It is a public comment submitted by a Native American of Terrebonne Parish. The
comment is preserved in its entirety in Figure 5 to demonstrate a point in full. She submits a
lengthy and eloquent explanation of the importance of her people, the richness of her culture, and
the vulnerability of future generations as the plan stands. She explains that the tribe blames no
one, but asks for the plan to present relocation strategies in order to help preserve the culture,
heritage, and traditions of her people:
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Figure 4. Comment by Shirell Parfait-Dardar, Active Chief of the Grand Caillou/Dulac Band of
Biloxi-Chitimacha Confederation of Muskogees (CPRA 2012b)

The CPRA added a page labeled “Transition Assistance” to the final plan. It did not
present relocation strategies. It did, however, vaguely explain that the CPRA needed to “develop
a planning framework to help communities, businesses and individuals adapt to anticipated
changes in the landscape” (CPRA 2012a:172) This shows that the CPRA acknowledged the
public comments regarding relocation assistance, but cannot deliver what is requested. Since the
public had not been engaged earlier in the process, location strategies were not requested, at least
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to a large extent, until the draft commentary phase. Relocation strategies, or any other requests
requiring time to execute for that matter, could not have been completed in time for the
submission of the final plan. The CPRA did, however, use the American Indian proverb in the
introduction (20), to illustrate a level collaboration with Native American Tribes and an
understanding of traditional land practices.
Cultural Heritage and Ethnic Blunders
Such faux pas toward ethnic groups appear again in the cultural heritage section of the
draft plan, as sardonically pointed out by Dr. Brian Marks:
…And while you’re at it, there’s a couple silly, objectionable errors you’ve made
regarding ethnic groups and communities in coastal Louisiana. (Not to mention
that you don’t address how the plan affects ethnic and racial groups differentially,
but that’s for another conversation.) You ought to write the name of the Houma
Nation correctly; you only say ‘Houma Nation’ in the plan. You ought not add
insult to injury by not just failing to document how vulnerable Dulac, Point au
Chien (you botched its name in two ways—No ‘s’ on Chene(s) despite the prior
plural ‘aux’ and among American Indians, the bayou is more commonly called
‘Point au Chien’), and Isle de Jean Charles will continue to be under this plan, but
you spelled their tribal name wrong, even though you put a picture of their
Principle Chief on the front cover of your report. And the Cajuns of Lafourche,
where the largest single historical migration of Acadians arrived in 1785, might
be surprised to know they don’t exist, and only ‘White Creoles’ live in South
Lafourche. (Be sure to tell 100.3 FM in Larose to change its slogan to ‘The
Ragin’ White Creole!’) And the exclusion of African Americans from South
Terrebonne (i.e. Bobtown in Dulac and Smithridge in Chauvin) and Chalmette
and the exclusion of the Vietnamese community from Houma (Village East) is
wrong. This brief list is not exhaustive of the significant ethnic communities
missing from your list, but you get the idea.
(Brian Marks, PhD, University of Arizona, Bureau of Applied Research
and Anthropology)
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Chapter VII

Recommendations
While Louisiana’s Comprehensive Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast may have relied on
cutting edge technology to evaluate the needs of the coast, it is not, in fact, sustainable by virtue
of its technocratic planning framework. By embracing the possibilities of science in combination
with traditional ecological knowledge, planners can foster collaboration within the community,
improve local support, and satisfy diverse local and regional interests. How could comanagement reform Louisiana’s Coastal Planning process? This research question is explored
by posing recommendations for an updated planning framework for Louisiana’s 2012 Coastal
Master Plan. These recommendations are specific to the Louisiana case, but basic framework can
also be extended to other similar environmental master plans.
1) The State of Louisiana should pass a mandate, or State Executive Order, requiring a
power-sharing structure between government (i.e., the State of Louisiana), experts (i.e.,
biophysical and social scientists, planners or other professionals), and citizens (i.e., those
holding local knowledge) to ensure plan sustainability which includes social equity
concerns (i.e., Campbell 1996) and citizen power within participation processes (i.e.,
Arnstein 1969).
a. To create a partnership level of citizen power (Arnstein 1969), a joint policy
board should be formed. Citizens on the local board should include local Native
American Tribes possessing traditional ecological knowledge, as well as African
Americans, Cajuns, Asians, and others with local knowledge.
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b. Expert advisory committees should be made up of both the biophysical and social
sciences in balanced and reasonable proportion, such that environmental
protection, economic development, and social equity may be equally represented.
Expert committees must work with the local citizen committee to combine
traditional and conventional management practices of Louisiana’s coast (i.e.,
Kristofferson & Berkes 2005).
c. The State of Louisiana will not lose its authority or accountability to other
stakeholders, but should be required to make decisions in partnership with, or in
the best interest of citizens, experts, and the State as a whole. Citizen leaders
should also be held accountable for their decisions, and shall be paid honoraria for
their efforts, and shall be given the financial resources to hire or fire consultants,
giving them “genuine bargaining influence over the outcome of the plan”
(Arnstein 1969:221-222).
2) Involve Southern Louisiana’s public from the beginning of the plan’s conceptual stage in
order to ensure iterative group learning, collaborative design, and trust-building are
achieved. These are foundation pillars of adaptive co-management (i.e., Holling 1973;
Folke et al. 2002; Ostrom 2003; Berkes 2009).
a. Local citizen boards should be formed and consulted from the beginning of the
planning process. Because the intent is to create a partnership (Arnstein 1969),
both the citizen committee and scientific committees, such as those on the
Framework Development Team and Focus Groups, will work together before the
conceptual plan is formed. This will ensure that all groups are generally in
agreement before substantial work progresses.
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b. Public meetings should be held in the beginning stages, and should be engaging
and participatory, unlike traditional public hearings with limited comment
periods. These public meetings should begin in the conceptual stages of the plan,
when the Citizen Committee and Framework Development Team are working
collaboratively to frame the needs of all stakeholders, but before substantial
engineering, modeling, or decision-making occurs.
c. Outreach planners should make several attempts to reach local populations, rather
than expecting the public to reach them. This was a common complaint within
the public comments log. Those doing outreach should be specially trained to
hold engaging public meetings and learn to take on effective dispute resolution
techniques as they may apply to communities of Louisiana. By visiting
communities, leaders are able to learn from others and build trust. Public
hearings should expand to counties in the Northern, non-coastal segments of
Louisiana, since these environmental decisions affect the population of the entire
state, if not the U.S. as a whole.
3) Appoint local, well-regarded individuals from the community to provide outreach,
promote resource stewardship, and hold positions on power-sharing committees.
a. Individuals should be nominated and voted into power on the citizen committee
by their fellow community members. Members of the citizen committee should
represent all coastal parishes in Louisiana. All historical minority groups should
also be represented on the committee at all times. These “Cultural Groups”
include Anglos, Cajuns, Native Americans, White Creoles, Creoles of Color,
Isleños, Croatians, Spanish, Vietnamese, and Italians (CPRA 2012:I-17). These
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stewards should serve as facilitators, coordinators, and partial power-holders in
the co-management framework.
b. These actors will be responsible for maintaining social networks within the
community, and endeavoring for social-ecological resilience. This message
should be clearly conveyed to Louisiana voters upon their appointments.
4) Embrace both traditional and conventional techniques of natural resource management
(i.e., Kristofferson & Berkes 2005).
a. Utilize traditional ecological knowledge of native populations passed down by
generations. Framework Development Teams should coordinate scientific
modeling efforts with local citizens, as advised by the Citizen Committee.
b. Note accounts of locals who may have intimate knowledge about species
monitoring or land change. The Framework Development Team and Citizen
Committee should create an official initiative to record and map knowledge about
local species monitoring, so information can be utilized and coordinated with
recent, conventional monitoring efforts.
Discussion and Conclusions
In Louisiana’s complex and changing coastal ecosystem, residents still hold hope that
their home can be saved and their way of life can be preserved. From technocracy to
traditionalism, reductionism to holistic approaches, social-ecological system management should
not be mistaken for a straightforward endeavor. By considering adaptive co-management, policy
makers allow for collaboration, trust-building, flexibility, and iterative learning amongst varied
institutional linkages. Though it is not to be considered a panacea, adaptive co-management
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continues to gain attention as an effective tool for the planning and management of fragile
ecosystems.
Louisiana’s Comprehensive Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast is primarily strong or
neutral as a general, or master plan, according to the analysis. The study follows William Baer’s
suggested evaluation criteria, appearing in “General Plan Evaluation Criteria: An Approach to
Making Better Plans.” The plan critique analysis found two or more weaknesses under “rational
model” considerations, procedural validity, and adequacy of scope. Within this context, an
imperfect level of plan efficacy was suggested.
In a region full of unique heritage, valuable resources, and resilient communities,
Louisiana has an obligation to develop a Coastal Master Plan of a genuinely sustainable nature.
Sustainability, of course, broadly requires a fair balance of environmental protection, economic
development, and social equity, according to eminent planning scholars such as Scott Campbell
(1996). This lies in contrast with CPRA definitions which narrowly refer to ecological resilience
and land building capacities only. In the sustainability analysis, the plan document itself
provided the data. Of the five plan objectives presented, three are environmental, one is
economic, and one is social. The decision drivers and decision criteria listed supported these
objectives. By categorizing these decision drivers/criteria further, the research shows that plan
considerations were 67 percent environmental, 20 percent economic, and 13 percent social,
undeniably achieving an unbalanced “planner’s triangle,” or a lack of sustainability.
By sharing decision-making power with local citizens, Louisiana can better accommodate
the interests of its residents. Sherry Arnstein’s “ladder of citizen participation” (1969) shows us
that tokenism occurs in public meetings when citizens are merely informed of decisions being
made, are consulted but given no power, or are placated. By referring to the unique public
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comments log in the appendix, the research shows that people repeatedly and redundantly claim
that social equity concerns are lacking.
Specifically they claim that materials were not sufficiently distributed; meetings were not
equally accessible; local knowledge was underutilized; minorities were not adequately engaged;
communities were not represented on planning teams; cultural heritage was undervalued;
community, commercial, and environmental balances were not achieved; consulted academics
were far-removed from communities; physical scientific analyses neglect human factors; social
vulnerability analyses were not conducted; indigenous tribes were unprotected; industries
received consideration over traditional communities; minorities appeared to be included in the
plan when they felt otherwise; citizen requests for analysis could not be fully delivered, and
mistakes appeared in the cultural heritage section. Each claim supports the theory that
Louisiana’s 2012 Coastal Master Plan was not sufficiently democratic, and citizens held little
power in the planning process.
To confront the inadequacies of the 2012 plan, the study presented recommendations
integrating solutions to purported shortcomings in the plan and alternative adaptive comanagement framework as discussed in the literature review. These recommendations suggest
power-sharing structures, citizen/expert committee collaboration, public engagement at early and
conceptual design stages, diversity on citizen committees, and support for the coordination of
traditional and conventional management practices.
Adaptive co-management sets governance at a standard above citizen placation or
consultation. It ushers in a new wave of local engagement that allows for the people to makes a
difference. Despite its merits, adaptive co-management must be explored at a national level to
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fill in knowledge gaps. The scarcity of adaptive co-management research in the United States
presents a limitation on relevant studies. In large part, this thesis is meant to encourage the
progressive thought processes of environmental planning agencies, and present possibilities for
alternative governance strategies.
Forthcoming research needs to address relationships and emerging politics between
entities sharing power, including citizen committees, expert committees, and the state.
Additionally, new research should investigate public perceptions of citizen power through
adaptive co-management in the U.S. Researchers may also explore governmental mechanisms
which make adaptive co-management less prolific in the United States as opposed to other
nations. Finally, forthcoming research should explore the possibilities of adaptive comanagement based upon levels of acceptability within divergent states or regions of the U.S.
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